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1 Introduction
Marbury v. Madison announced that it is "emphatically" the power of the

judiciary to "say what the law is." 1 Notwithstanding Chief Justice Marshall's
confident exposition of judicial power, Marbury's holding has done nothing
to quiet doubts concerning the judiciary's authority to declare that the actions
of more accountable, and more expert, institutions are contrary to governing
law. Indeed, in academic circles, the debate about the efficacy and legitimacy
of judicial review enjoys a renewed vigor. 2 As interesting as this debate has
been, and continues to be, the true measure of the state of judicial power lies
in the practice and pronouncements of the Supreme Court. By that light,
judicial review could not be stronger. In the past six terms or so, the Rehnquist
Court has "emphatically" asserted its power under Marbury to "say what the
law is."
Two phenomena are particularly noteworthy in this regard, and they are
the focus of~ Article. The first is the marked decline in the deference the
Court is willing to afford legislative enactments pursuant to Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Section 5 grants Congress the power to enact all
"appropriate" measures to "enforce" rights under the Fourteenth Amendment,
including the right to equal treatment under the law. 3 Although the Court has
1. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
2. See generally LoUIS MICHAEL SEIDMAN, OUR UNSETIUID CONS1TI1.m0N (2001);
RICHARD A. POSNER, FRONTIERS OF LEGAL THEORY 14-27 (200 1) (reviewing contours ofrecent
debates).
3. Section 1 ofthe Fourteenth Amendment provides, in relevant part:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
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traditionally deferred to any "rational" exercise of the Section 5 power, the
Rehnquist Court has invalidated several exercises of the enforcement power
as improper incursions into the Court's authority to declare the substance of
constitutional rights. One of the means by which the Court has invalidated
Section 5 enactments is by faulting Congress for failing to compile and present
a "legislative record" demonstrating the "congruence and proportionality" of
remedial or prophylactic legislation under Section 5. 4
The second separation of powers phenomenon involves the Rehnquist
Court's new approach to judicial review of executive agency interpretations of
law. Executive agencies, whose "reasonable" or "permissible" interpretations
offederal statutes have been entitled to strong judicial deference since Chevron
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,S will henceforth have
to earn deference under a bifurcated deference principle. In the past two
Terms, Chevron's broad domain has been significantly narrowed and its bright
line deference rule diminished. In Christensen v. Harris County 6 and United
States v. Mead Corp., 1 the Court announced that Chevron's strong deference
applies only in the limited circumstance in which the Court is convinced, by
reference to a combination of the agency's statutory grant of authority and the
formality of the proceedings that produced the specific rule in question, that
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law, nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment states: "The Congress shall have the power to
enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of [this article)." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,
§ 5. Similar enforcement provisions are contained in other Civil War Amendments. U.S.
CaNST. amend. xm, § 2; U.S. CaNST. amend. XV,§ 2. Unless discussing Section 5 specifi·
cally, this Article will refer to these provisions collectively as the "enforcement power."
4. There has been a steady flow of criticism in the commentary regarding what is referred
to as "legislative record" review in Section 5 cases. See generally A. Christopher Bryant &
Timothy J. Simeone, Remanding to Congress: The Supreme Court's New "On The Record"
Constitutional Review of Federal Statutes, 86 CORNEll. L. REV. 328 (2001); William W.
Buzbee & Robert A. Shapiro, Legislative Record Review, 54 STAN. L. REv. 87 (2001); Ruth
Colker & James J. Brudney,Dissing Congress, 100 MICH. L. REv. 80 (2001). The criticism
began when the Court indicated in United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), that fmdings
might aid judicial review of enactments pursuant to the Commerce Clause. See generally
Harold J. Kent, Turning Congress into an Agency: The Propriety of Requiring Legislative
Findings, 46 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 731 (1996); PhilipP. Frickey, The Fool on the Hill:
Congressional Findings, Constitutional Adjudication, and United States v. Lopez, 46 CASE W.
REs. L. REv. 695 (1996).
5. 467 u.s. 837 (1984).
6. 529 u.s. 576 (2000).
7. 533 u.s. 218 (2001).
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Congress has given the power to the agency to issue interpretations with the
"force oflaw."8 In all other cases, agencies must fight for judicial "respect"
under Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 9 which scales deference of an apparently
weaker sort, based on factors such as the thoroughness of the agency's reasoning, the logic of the interpretation it has rendered, the consistency of the
interpretation with prior pronouncements, and any other factors that might
convince the court of the "persuasiveness" of the agency's interpretation. 10
Chevron's long reign as a uniform deference rule has now come to an end.
The Court has officially authorized lower courts to exercise their independent
judgment with respect to the vast majority of agency interpretations.
This Article links the Section 5 cases and the Mead doctrine as parallel
manifestations of the ascendancy ofMarbury's core principle - that it is "emphatically" a judicial function to "say what the law is." The Rehnquist Court
has newly asserted the primacy of its power to declare the meaning of the
Constitution under Section 5, which grants Congress broad power to enforce
constitutional rights. Similarly, the Court has taken back a substantial measure
of the power to interpret governing law that it ceded in Chevron, which
instructed courts to uphold reasonable agency interpretations of the statutes
they are charged with enforcing. The Section 5 cases represent a departure
from the model of judicial review applied to early enforcement enactments.
Similarly, if Chevron was the "counter-Marbury for the administrative state, "11
Mead is the Rehnquist Court's counter-Chevron. Under the Court's recent
Section 5 precedents and the Mead doctrine, the power to render definitive
constructions of law is of paramount concern.
The Rehnquist Court's "congruence and proportionality" standard for
Section 5 enactments has been almost uniformly condemned by commentators,
who view the approach as disrespectful of Congress's prerogative to find the
facts underlying legislative enactments. 12 These critics argue that it is a
8. Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000).
9. 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
10. See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) (finding agency interpretations persuasive, but not controlling).
11. Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 2071,
2074 (1990). Prior to Mead, commentators increasingly had been calling for a reassessment of
the scope of Chevron deference. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron's Domain, 89 OEo. L.J. 833, 835 (2001) ("The time is therefore propitious for taking stock
of when Chevron deference properly starts and stops within the scheme of administrative
review.").
12. See supra note 4 (noting recent commentary critical of record review in Section 5
cases). But see Neil Devins, Congressional Facifinding and the Scope of Judicial Review: A
Preliminary Analysis, SO DuKE L.J. 1169, 1173 n.18 (2001) (asserting that "claims that the
Rehnquist Court is disavowing traditionalist deference to legislative factfinding seem somewhat
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mainstay of separation of powers that the Court will presume that the legislature bad an empirical basis for believing that a legislative response was
necessary to address a "real" harm or evil. This deference, like that afforded
under Chevron to agency interpretations, is grounded upon the Court's appreciation of its position in the constitutional system, including its deficiencies
as a finder of fact and its counter-majoritarian status. 13 Commentators view
the heightened record review phenomenon as a radical departure from this
principle and as a manifestation of an unwarranted distrust of Congress's
motives. Specifically, the Court is viewed as masking core federalism concerns with Section 5 enactments behind a veil of factual review.
Because commentators unifonnly view the Section 5 precedents as
record-centric judicial review, rather than an assertion of judicial interpretive
supremacy, none ofthe many recent critiques of record review has noted the
connection between the Mead doctrine and the Court's approach under Section 5. Both phenomena originate in the Court's distrust of Congress. The
Court's recent Section 5 jurisprudence is grounded upon a concern that Congress, which has the power to "enforce" constitutional guarantees, will instead
seek to render substantive interpretations of the Fourteenth Amendment that
are inconsistent with, or in the Court's view not warranted by, the Constitution. Similarly, ~e Mead doctrine is a manifestation of the Court's doublebarreled skepticism regarding Congress's ability to (1) thoughtfully delegate
the power to issue binding legal interpretations to agencies, aiid (2) act to
overturn agency interpretations in ever-more-novel areas that are inconsistent
with legislative purpose. Just as the judiciary is the final authority on issues
of statutory construction, so too in the Court's opinion must it rendet the final
decision on matters of constitutional construction. A presumption of congressional carelessness, or worse, accounts for Marbury's ascendance.
This Article takes the position that the Rehnquist Court's recent Section
5 precedents, properly conceptualized, are not principally instances of heightened judicial review of legislative factual predicates, but rather are broader
assertions of the Court's power to interpret the Constitution. Section 5 vests
Congress with primary responsibility for enforcing and administering the provisions of Section 1 ofthe Fourteenth Amendment. Just as agencies construe
and interpret statutes in the course of administering them, so too does Conoverblown").
13. The familiar rationality standard, which severely limits the scope of judicial review
of legislative judgments, is rooted in this deference principle. The stated reasons for such
restraint vary, from a recognition that legislators "enjoy a familiarity with local conditions which
this Court cannot have" to the recognition that the jQdiciary should not assume "a legislative
role . . . for which the Court lacks both authority and competence." San Antonio Indep. Sch.
Dist. v. Rodriguez. 411 U.S. 1, 31,41 (1973).
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gress place its construction on the rights set forth in the Constitution when it
exercises its express enforcement power under Section 5. The "congruence
and proportionality" standard is not utilized to measure whether there is
substantial evidence to support Congress's factual predicate. Recent Section
5 legislation demonstrates that Congress has the capacity to compile voluminous records. In recent Section 5 cases, the Court acknowledged that Congress has the power to construe constitutional rights more expansively than the
judiciary. Having made that concession, however, the Court is unable to
conceive of a principled method for reviewing Congress's interpretations of
constitutional rights. What invariably results is the rejection of Congress's
construction for failure to satisfy a judicial predicate, which is based upon the
Court's narrow interpretation of constitutional rights and concomitantly broad
interpretation of the principle of stare decisis. 14 This Article hopes to demonstrate that it is this doctrinal shift in application of the deference principle, not
mere heightened record review, that accounts for Congress's abysmal recent
record under Section 5.
If Congress shares the enforcement power under the Fourteenth Amendment with the Court, as the text of Section 5 plainly contemplates, its constructions should receive some degree of judicial deference. The difficulty, as the
Court has acknowledged and emphatically demonstrated, lies in drawing the
line between enactments that fill enforcement gaps in the Constitution and
those that purport to change the substantive meaning of the text. The Court
should have more than a passing familiarity with this dilemma. Chevron itself
was a compromise between proponents of judicial supremacy and advocates
for a deference principle that would afford weight to the reasonable interpretations of more expert, more accountable executive agencies. The Court's
traditional model for reviewing the enforcement powers under the Civil War
Amendments adopted a similar compromise, based upon the same appreciation
of differing institutional accountability and competence. Under each deference principle, whether the Court would have resolved complex tensions
differently if the matter had been taken up first in the courts was beside the
point. So long as the interpretation was reasonable and the end was legitimate,
the construction was to be upheld. 15

14. See infra Part V.C.l (discussing Court's broad view of stare decisis).
15. Other commentators have noted the Section 5/Chevron analogy. See David Cole, The
Value ofSeeing Things Differently: Boerne v. Flores and Congressional Enforcement of the
Bill ofRights, 1997 SUP. CT. REv. 31,65-66 (using Chevron and Dormant Commerce Clause
to demonstrate that deferential review does not undermine judicial supremacy). This Article
goes a step further by proposing a model for reviewing the reasonableness of Section 5 enactments based on the new Mead model for review of agency constructions of law.
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Just as the Chevron compromise has come somewhat undone, so too has
the Court begun to revisit its early model of review under Section 5. But,
although agencies do not interpret law under any constitutional grant, the
model under Mead is far more forgiving than the model the Rehnquist Court
has adopted for Section 5. After Mead, strong Chevron deference still applies
where a court is satisfied that Congress adequately expressed its intent to
empower the agency to issue binding interpretations. Even when Congress has
not made an express delegation, the Court remains willing to consider whether

the agency's construction of governing law is 11persuasive, 11 based upon consideration of the thoroughness, consistency, and validity of the agency's reasoning. Under Section 5, by contrast, the Rehnquist Court seems disinclined to
defer ever to Congress's construction of rights. Under Section 5, there is no
room for filling enforcement gaps with legislative constructions, no matter how
persuasive they may be.
At present, the Court has no principled method by which to review Section 5 legislation. It has chosen judicial supremacy over all else, despite its
continuing assurances that Congress has the authority to render extra-judicial
interpretations of constitutional rights. This Article urges the Court to consider its recently announced approach to review of agency interpretations of
federal law as a model for review of Congress's Section 5 enactments. Although it has not done so consciously, the Court already has laid the groundwork for doing just that. The recent Section 5 precedents set forth a two-step
inquiry that parallels the familiar two-step inquiry under the Court's Chevron
model. At Step One, the Court asks, as it does under Chevron, whether the
governing law, in this case its own precedents, speaks to the precise question
at issue. When the governing law is not clear, the Court proceeds, as under
Chevron, to Step Two. There the Court eschews the traditional inquiry as to
whether Congress's construction is reasonable or rational and instead asks
whether it is 11 congruent and proportional.. with respect to the right Congress
is permitted to enforce or remedy. This is the point at which the Court uniformly refuses to consider whether an interpretation that differs even slightly
from its own is entitled to weight or any degree of deference. It refuses, at
this point, to engage in a Skidmore-type evaluation of Congress's in~reta
tion, based upon the predicate Congress put forward in support of that interpretation.
IfMarbury means anything, it is that when the Court has spoken directly
to the precise issue under consideration, Congress lacks power under Section
5 to codify a change in substantive law. Although a direct conflict in legislative and judicial interpretations on the same issue is certainly possible, 16 it is
16.

See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507,532-35 (1997) (fmding that Section 5
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likely to be increasingly rare. The Rehnquist Court, to a degree greater than
its predecessors, prefers to settle as little as possible in constitutional cases .17
This means that enforcement gaps under the Equal Protection Clause and
other provisions will abound. Where Congress acts to fill these gaps, the
Court has several options in fashioning judicial review, ranging from strong
deference to Congress's reasonable constructions to the Court's current model
of judicial supremacy.
Just as the Chevron deference principle has been worn down by hard
experience, there may be good reasons now to reject the strong deference
signaled in the Court's early enforcement precedents. Nevertheless, there
ought to be room for some deference. If any agency construction - even the
. least formal- is entitled to some weight based on its merits, by what rationale
are all congressional constructions destined to fail insofar as they do not
adhere to some broad principle of stare decisis? The Court revived Skidmore
precisely because it did not view the choice for reviewing courts as either
strong deference or no deference at all to agency constructions. The same
logic applies under Section 5, where a Skidmore-type approach would respect
legislative expertise and accountability, while retaining the judicial power to
"say what the law is." The Court should consider deferring to Congress's
interpretations not solely when they hew narrowly to precedent, but also when
the logic, care, and consistency of those interpretations have the "power to
persuade."
This Article proceeds in five major parts. Part D explains the origins,
practice, and philosophy of judicial deference to legislative judgments, with
particular attention paid to the review of legislative evidence. This Part gives
substantial attention to the phenomenon of record review, chiefly to place the
matter of "legislative record review11 in context during the subsequent discussion of the enforcement power. Parts m and IV discuss, respectively, the
Rehnquist Court's review of enactments under Section 5 and its revised
approach to judicial review of agency interpretations of law. Part V links
these two approaches and uses the Court's model for reviewing agency interpretations as a means of conceptualizing, as well as critiquing, its review of
Section 5 enactments. Part VI concludes by suggesting that the Court review
Section 5 enactments as it does agency interpretations of governing law and
thereby open itself to persuasion, deference, and, ultimately, a critical dialogue with Congress concerning the meaning of the Constitution.
enactment created far more stringent prohibitions on state conduct than did judicial interpretation of constitutional guarantee that Congress was pwporting to enforce).
17.

Seegenerai~CASSR.SUNS'11!1N,ONBCASBATA TIME: JUDICIALMlNIMAUsMONTim

SUPREME COURT (1999) (positing that current Supreme Court is "minimalist" in that it tends to
leave most difficult and divisive issues undecided).
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H. Judicial Deforence to Legislative Predicates
Much of the debate concerning the Court's recent "legislative record"
requirement in Section 5 cases focuses on the Court's traditional deference to
legislative factfinding. Commentators argue that the Court has effected a radical re-ordering ofthe separation of powers by subjecting legislative predicates
to heightened review. In fact, the history of the deference principle as applied
to Congress's factual predicates is a rather complicated matter. To be sure,
there are statements in the cases that Congress is not required to create a
record at all and that courts will not second-guess disputed factual predicates.18 But judicial resort to legislative records is neither expressly forbidden
by the Constitution nor unheard of in practice. For the Rehnquist Court,
heightened record review is rooted in judicial distrust, and both are particularly manifest when the Court considers the legislative enactment "novel" in
tenns of context and past practice and appears to diminish the Court's power
to exercise independent judgment as to constitutional meaning.

A. Ordinary Record Review
Historically, the record supporting government action has not been a
central aspect of constitutional adjudication. This is not to say that facts have
not been important. 19 Rather, it is to suggest that even when we might expect
the underlying factual record to be of particular interest - as, for example,
when the Court doubts the motives of government- the Court has not typically
focused on the legislative record to resolve questions of constitutional rights
and powers. This has been true, as we shall see, in most cases implicating
express legislative powers, including the few early enforcement cases to come
before the Court. The current emphasis on legislative records in the enforcement context is a manifestation of the changed dynamic of judicial review in
constitutional adjudication.
Ordinary record review applies in most instances in which Congress
exercises its express powers. The ordinary presumption, drawn from the mere
existence of the enactment, is that facts exist in support of the exercise of
legislative power. Congress is under no obligation to make factual findings
18. See, e.g., FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 315 (1993) ("[A]
legisla1ive choice is not subject to cour1room factfinding and
be based on ra1ional specula1ion unsupported by evidence or empirical data.").
19. See David L. Faigman, "Normative Constitutional Fact-Finding": Exploring the
Empirical Component of Constitutional Interpretation, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 541, 547 (1991)
(discussing Court's interpretation of empirical research and its role in "constitutional lawmaking"); see also David L. Faigman, Madisonian Balancing: A Theory ofConstitutional Adjudication, 88 Nw. U. L. REv. 641, 664-71 (1994) (proposing new rules for measuring legislative facts in constitutional adjudication).

may
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or to support its position with empirical evidence; its efforts in that regard
may "aid" judicial review, but they are not mandatory. When there exist facts
contrary to those relied upon by the legislature - when the matter is at least
debatable - the deference principle gives the legislature the benefit of the
doubt. Indeed, even when there are no facts to review, a court must uphold the
legislature's judgment if any state of facts, whether known to the legislature or
not, support its choice. Democratic deliberation is generally presumed,20 and
factual mistakes are to be corrected electorally rather than in the courts. Courts
will uphold Congress's judgment that its enactment is within an express grant
of power so long as the judgment is not irrational.
1. Deftrence to "Reasonable" Legislative Choices and "Rational"
Factual Predicates

Article I, which enumerates Congress's affirmative powers,21 vests in
Congress the power to choose any means "necessary and proper" to carry out
its enumerated powers. 22 Early doctrine stressed that judicial review in this
realm should be limited to whether Congress's end was "legitimate" and within
''the letter and spirit of the constitution. "23 ntis early conception of judicial
review granted Congress sweeping constitutional authority to choose the
appropriate means for addressing matters that fell within its aftinnative powers
and neither invited nor entertained challenges to legislative predicates. So long
as Congress's ·chosen means did not run afoul of some other constitutional
prohibition, the courts were to defer to Congress, given its clearer representative mandate and factfinding expertise. To interfere with Congress's choices,
the Court declared, "would be to pass the line which circumscribes the judicial
department, and to tread on legislative ground. "24
Despite these early pronouncements, the Court demonstrated that it was
indeed highly prone to tread on the legislative prerogative. Its early Commerce
Clause jurisprudence is, in retrospect, a window into the present debate concerning review of enforcement legislation. The Court fell into disrepute when,
from the 1880s to the 1930s, it moved away from presumptive legislative
20. This presumption can be rebutted in extraordinary circumstances. See Cleburne v.
Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985) (refusing to apply intermediate scrutiny to
municipality's exclusion of group home for mentally disabled, but invalidating choice based on
municipality's motive of"bare" animus toward disabled persons).
21. See U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 8.
22. See id. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 ("Congress shall have the Power ... To make all Laws which
shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers and all other
Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.").
23. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316,421 (1819).
24. Id. at 423.
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power and began to rely upon arbitrary and formalistic categories of commercial activity in delineating the scope of the commerce power .25 During the
now-infamous Lochner era,26 the judiciary strayed from the original deference
principle, finding numerous pieces of social and economic legislation to be in
violation of the Due Process Clause. In Lochner v. New Yorfi2 1 itself, for
example, the Court, while maintaining that it was not 11 substituting the judgment of the court for that of the legislature, 1128 confidently held that legislation
regulating bakers' wages and hours was an irrational exercise of the legislative power. Its conclusion was based on the 11 connnon understanding, ..
informed by an absence of empirical evi~ce to the contrary, that the trade
of baker was not an unhealthy one. 29
· Recognizing the drag on its legitimacy from such interference, the Court
eventually stepped back into line in the 1930s and 1940s, deferring once again
to reasonable legislative determinations. 30 Rather than rely on arbitrary rules
of categorization or notions of judicial common sense, the Court reverted to
presumptive rules in favor of the legislative branch. Congress's judgment as
to the exercise of its spending power, for example, was to be upheld 11unless
the choice is clearly wrong, a display of arbitrary power, not an exercise of
judgment. 1131 The Court once again treated such legislative judgments as
matters of degree, with which the courts were not authorized to interfere
except in the most extraordinary cases. 32 The deference principle, so modified, respected all manner of judgments rendered pursuant to Congress's
affirmative powers.
Beginning in the 1960s, this judicial deference to reasonable legislative
judgments sustained a number of enactments under Congress's enforcement
25. See, e.g., United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895) (drawing distinction
between "commerce" and "manufacture").
26. The Lochner era is commonly understood to extend from the Supreme Court's
decision in Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), until the repudiation of Lochner, which
began in West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
27.
198 u.s. 45 (1905).
28. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 56-57 (1905).
29. Id. at 57-58.
30. See Wickard v. Filbum, 317 U.S. 111, 127 (1942) (holding that farmer's production
of wheat for home consumption fell within Congress's regulatory power); United States v.
Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 115 (1941) (upholding Fair Labor Standards Act); NLRB v. Jones &
Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 32 (1937) (upholding National Labor Relations Act).
31. Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619,640 (1937).
32. See, e.g., Wickard, 317 U.S. at 123 n.24 ("Whatever terminology is used, the criterion
is necessarily one of degree and must be so defined. This does not satisfY those who seek for
mathematical or rigid formulas. But such formulas are not provided by the great concepts of
the Constitution .... ").
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powers. 33 The breadth of Congress's remedial and enforcement powers extended even to state practices that, although invidious, had not yet been held
unconstitutional. So long as such enactments were consistent with ''the letter
and spirit of the constitution, "34 the Court upheld them. It is with caution that
this Article categorizes these early enforcement precedents as examples of
ordinary record review. As we shall see, it is certainly the case that the Court
applied a deferential "reasonableness" standard. Less clear, however, is the
significance of the "legislative record" in these cases.
In South Carolina v. Katzenbach,35 the Court upheld various provisions
of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 as ."appropriate" enactments under Section
2 of the Fifteenth Amendment. 36 The "historical experience" of the country
and the Court, with rampant voting rights discrimination, undoubtedly had a
profound influence on the Court. 37 The Court noted that Congress, before it
enacted the voting rights measures, had explored the problem with "great
care. "38 The Court was satisfied that Congress had rationally concluded that
its past remedial measures had failed to put an end to the "pervasive evil" of
discrimination. 39 South Carolina argued that the suspension of literacy tests,
one of the many prophylactic measures set forth in the Act, was beyond
Congress's power as the Court had held that literacy tests were not per se
unconstitutional. 40 But the Court concluded that literacy tests, although not
per se unconstitutional, had been used intentionally to deny the franchise to
African American citizens. According to the Court, Congress had reasonably
determined that a ban was necessary and had "pennissibly" rejected the
alternative of requiring a complete re-registration of voters. 41
In Katzenbach v. Morgan, 42 the Court noted that Congress had gained a
"specially infonned legislative competence" as a result of its work on the

33. For example, the Court recognized Congress's plenary power under the Thirteenth
Amendment "to determine what are the badges and incidents of slavery, and the authority to
translate that determination into effective legislation." Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S.
409. 440 (1968).
34. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316,421 (1819).
35. 383 u.s. 301 (1966).
36. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301,308 (1966).
37. Jd.
38. Jd.
39. Jd. at 309.
40. !d. at 333; see also Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45,
52-53 (1959) (finding that literacy tests may be constitutional).
41. South Carolina.v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 334 (1966).
42. 384 u.s. 641 (1966).
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Voting Rights Act. 43 The Court again emphasized that, when reviewing enforcement legislation, courts were not to second-guess Congress's considered
judgments or the weight Congress accorded to competing considerations.
Morgan upheld Section 4(e) of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, which prohibited enforcement of state statutory requirements for literacy in English to
detennine eligibility for the franchise, as 11appropriate11 legislation pursuant to
Section 5. The State ofNew York, which had such a law, argued that Congress lacked the power under Section 5 to prohibit English literacy laws unless
a court had expressly held that such laws violate the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Court had no trouble rejecting New York's argument, either as a textual
or historical matter. Congress, the Court said, was not limited under Section
5 to 11merely infonning the judgment of the judiciary. 1144 Rather, 11 [C]orrectly
viewed, § 5 is a positive grant of legislative power authorizing Congress to
exercise its discretion in detennining whether and what legislation is needed
to secure the guarantees ofthe Fourteenth Amendment. 1145 So long as the Court
could perceive some basis upon which Congress predicated its judgment that
the use ofliteracytests constituted invidious discrimination in violation of the.
Equal Protection Clause, Congress's judgment would not be disturbed. 46 State
intransigence with respect to voting rights provided an the basis that was
needed.
In South Carolina v. Katzenbach, the Court had established that Congress
was not required to hew precisely to the Court's own view of constitutionality
when exercising its enforcement power. Many years later, in City ofRome v.
United States, 41 the Court reaffirmed that Section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment granted Congress a significant measure of discretion to fill gaps in the
enforcement of constitutional rights. In City of Rome, the Court upheld
Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, which prohibited local electoral changes
that were discriminatory in either purpose or effect, as appropriate legislation
under Section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment. 48 Again deciding against the
backdrop of 11 pervasive evil11 that Congress and the Court both had recognized
in the voting rights area,49 the Court held that Congress was permitted to
prohibit electoral changes that merely had discriminatory impact, even if the
Court itself would find only purposeful discrimination to be constitutionally
43.
44.

45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Katzcnbach v. Morgan. 384 U.S. 641,655 (1966).
/d. at 649.
I d. at 651.
/d. at 656.
446 u.s. 156 (1980).
City ofRome v. United States,446 U.S. 156,177-78 (1980).
South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301,309 (1966).
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proscribed. 50 The Court was satisfied that "Congress could rationally have
concluded that, because electoral changes by jurisdictions with a demonstrable
history of intentional racial discrimination in voting create the risk of purposeful discrimination, it was proper to prohibit changes that have a discriminatory
impact." 51 Congress's "considered judgment,"52 which it had consistently
applied,53 would not be disturbed by any judicial notion of stare decisis.
How much the enforcement decisions (South Carolina, Morgan, City of
Rome), read together, had to do with empirical predicates is not clear. To be
sure, Congress had compiled a considerable record of pervasive discrimination
in connection with the Voting Rights Act of 1965, and the Court made liberal
use of the record in upholding various provisions of the Act. But the extent to
which the Court was prepared to defer to Congress's judgments was remarkably broad- as broad as the scope of the Necessary and Proper Clause. And
the Court appeared to be content to let the matter rest with Congress so long as
there was a perceptible basis for its ultimate judgment as to what the Constitution required. What was not certain was how the Court would react to enforcement enactments that did not bear witness to the Civil Rights era. The Court
would not have occasion to consider the matter for many years.
2. The Benefit ofthe Empirical Doubt

The post-Lochner presumption of constitutionality did not settle the
matter of legislative records in constitutional adjudication. Even when the
government's interest was supported by fact, the presumption ofconstitutionality was rebuttable, at least in theory. The question was when, if ever, the
presumption could be overcome in practice, in particular by a strong factual
showing that Congress's judgment was in error. In Lochner itself, the defendants had urged the Court to consider statistical evidence proportionally
demonstrating that there was no material danger to workers in the baking
industry. The Court was quite willing to do so, and the evidence convinced the
Court that the baker's trade was not a particUlarly unhealthy one. 54 The Court
thus concluded that the challenged legislation was not a permissible exercise
of police powers in promotion of health, safety, or morals, but rather an impermissible regulation of employment relations. 55
50. City ofRome, 446 U.S. at 173, 175, 177.
51. ld.at177.
52. ld. at 178.
53. See id. at 173 ("Congress recognized that the Act prohibited both discriminatory
purpose and effect when, in 1975, it extended the Act for another seven years.").
54. Lochnerv. New York, 198 U.S. 45,59 (1905).
55. Jd.
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This entertainment of statistical evidence struck some as an invitation to
challenge legislative predicates. The so-called "Brandeis Brief' became a popular weapon used to challenge the reasonableness oflegislative detenninations.
These lengthy briefs contained reams of statistical and other empirical data
bearing specifically on the purported factual predicate for the legislation at
issue. Sometimes the information presented was treated as establishing the
"common understanding" as to a certain factual issue, and the Court would
invalidate the statute. 56 In other cases, the Court reflexively applied the presumptive rule in favor of constitutionality, notwithstanding the presentation of
substantial evidence that Congress had erred. 57
Although the view that factual predicates must be presumed valid ultimately prevailed, the matter of the legislative record refused to go away
entirely. Indeed, the struggle to define a workable model for judicial review
of legislative predicates arguably began in earnest only in United States v.
Carolene Products Co., 58 decided in 193 8 and now famous for other reasons. 59
Carolene Products is a watershed example ofthe Court's post-Lochner empirical ambivalence. The Court ultimately upheld the federal Filled Milk Act
against claims that it was beyond Congress's corrunerce power and that it
violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The Caro/ene
Products Court readily concluded that the commerce power permitted a
prohibition on the shipment of filled milk in interstate commerce. As for the
Due Process Clause, the Court found that the statute, although infringing upon
liberty and property, had a rational basis. 60 Characterizing the necessity of
filled-milk regulation as "at least debatable," the Court held that "neither the
finding of a court arrived at by weighing the evidence, nor the verdict of a jury
can be substituted for it. "61
Although the Court appeared willing to base its decision entirely on the
"presumption of constitutionality" that attached to the statute, it did not do so.
56. See Bunting v. Oregon, 243 U.S. 426,438-39 (1917) (upholding Oregon labor law);
Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412,420-21 (1908) (same).
57. See, e.g., Borden's Farm Prods. Co. v. Baldwin, 293 U.S. 194, 208-09 (1934) (upholding New York milk. control law); O'Oorman & Young, Inc. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 282
U.S. 251, 257-58 (1931) (upholding New Jersey statute regulating insurance commissions).
Ironically, once he joined the Court, Justice Brandeis himself took the position that the courts
must presume the existence of facts underlying legislative judgments. See Pacific States Box
& Basket Co. v. White, 296 U.S. 176, 184-85 (1935) (upholding, in opinion written by Justice
Brandeis, Oregon law regulating size and shape offruit containers).
58. 304 u.s. 144 (1938).
59. United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144 (1938). The chief reason for
Carolene Products's future notoriety, of course, was Justice Jackson's famous "footnote four."
60. ld. at 148.
61. ld. at 154.
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The Court noted that there was also 11 affinnative evidence11 to sustain the
statute. 62 It referred to two decades of cumulative evidence that filled milk
was injurious to the public health, evidence that Congress had accumulated
from committee hearings, the testimony of 11 eminent scientists and health
experts, 11 and an 11 extensive investigation.. of the commerce in milk compounds. 63 Of course, the Constitution could not be interpreted to require that
Congress disregard such evidence in enacting its prohibition.64 Nor, however,
was the Court's function merely to rubber stamp Congress's factual predicates. Thus, although the Court deemed that reliance on the presumption was
appropriate under the specific circumstances of Carolene Products, the Court
reaffirmed its own power to review legislative factual predicates. 65
In theory, this meant that when the. facts the legislature relied upon had
ceased to exist, judicial review included the power to invalidate the enactment
as unsupported by a sufficient empirical record. In later practice, however, the
rational basis standard would nearly always save even a factually suspect
enactment from being invalidated. Under rational basis review, a court must
uphold ordinary legislation if any state of facts, 11either known or which could
reasonably be assumed, 11 supports it. 66 In such cases, factual findings and other
evidence considered by legislators are not necessary, but might be useful to
courts as 11 aiding informed judicial review, .. in the same way that committee
reports .. reveal[ ] the rationale of the legislation. 1167
Nevertheless, Carolene Products left open the possibility, however remote, that some empirical showing might satisfy the Court that the legislature
had acted irrationally. Again, as after Lochner, that small opening was all the
invitation litigators would need to contest factual allegations and seek to
overcome the deference rule. They pointed to the absence of a legislative
record or to evidence tending to show that the legislature's facts were contradicted by other facts, or had simply ceased to exist. All of these efforts to
62. /d. at 148.
63. /d.
64. /d. at 149.
65. The Supreme Court treated factual matters in much the same way in other cases during
this period. In Helveringv. Davis, 301 U.S. 619,640 (1937), the Court found that the Social
Security Act was within Congress's broad power under the Spending Clause. The opinion does
not rest, however, exclusively on the breadth of Congress's power. The Court was careful to
note that, in passing the Act, "Congress did not improvise a judgment when it found that the
· award of old age benefits would be conducive to the general welfare." /d. at 641. The Court
pointed to "[e]xtensive hearings" and a "great mass of evidence" supporting the legislative
policy. /d. at 642. In any event, the Court found that Congress "had a basis" for its belief and
its choice was not "arbitrary." !d. at 644,645.
66. Caroline Products, 304 U.S. at 154.
67. !d. at 152.
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undennine legislative factual predicates backfired rather famously when the
Court clarified its prior statements by making plain that legislatures need not
create any empirical record at all. 68 Challengers of ordinary legislation would
not prevail simply by contesting the factual predicate for the legislative judgment. 69 When Congress determined, for example, that mandatory retirement
for certain federal officials at a specified age was a wise restriction related to
the reliability and fitness of those employees for the foreign service, those
affected vigorously contested the purported connection between age, fitness,
and reliability. In Vance v. Bradley,10 the Supreme Court accepted the connection between age and fitness, plainly one open to some debate, as a "common
sense proposition."71 The Court emphasized that even when the legislature
voluntarily undertakes fact-finding and the evidence on a factual issue is
conflicting, courts are not to weigh the evidence against the legislative judgment with that presented in its favor. 72
The Court's rule in favor oflegislative judgments with regard to ordinary
social and economic legislation was rooted in the separation of powers. The
Court found that, in the face of conflicting evidence, the judicial function was
severely circumscribed. 73 The Court would not countenance an unelected
68. See Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 812 (1976) ("The state is not
compelled to verifY logical assumptions with statistical evidence."); see also Heller v. Doe, 509
U.S. 312,320 (1993) ("A state, moreover, has no obligation to produce evidence to sustain the
rationality of a statutory classification.").
69. See Bhd. of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pac. R.R.,
393 U.S. 129, 139 (1968) (stating that factual questions concerning railroad safety were
"essentially a matter of public policy, and public policy can, under our constitutional system,
be fixed only by the people acting through their elected representatives").
70. 440 u.s. 93 (1979).
71. Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 112 (1979).
72. See id. (stating that it is "the very admission that the facts are arguable that immunizes
from constitutional attack the congressional judgment"). The concept was not exactly novel.
See Rast v. Van Deman & Lewis Co., 240 U.S. 342, 357 (1916) ("It makes no difference that
the facts may be disputed or their effect opposed by argument and opinion of serious strength.
It is not within the competency of the courts to arbitrate in such contrariety.").
73. See, e.g., Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997) (upholding legislative prerogative
to establish standards of "mental illness" in civil commitment proceedings). The Court recognized the disagreement among psychiatric professionals in making such detenninations, but
upheld the state's choice:
These disagreements [among psychiatric professionals], however, do not tie the
State's hands in setting the bounds of its civil commitment laws. In fact, it is precisely where such disagreement exists that legislatures have been afforded the widest
latitude in drafting such statutes. As we have explained regarding congressional
enactments, when a legislature "undertakes to act in areas fraught with medical and
scientific uncertainties, legislative options must be especially broad and courts
should be cautious not to rewrite legislation."
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judiciary judging the merits ofthe legislature's factual predicate for exercising
its express power under the Constitution to regulate commercial activity, provide for the safety of its citizenry, or administer foreign relations.
All of these considerations applied when the Court reviewed ordinary
economic legislation. For other enactments, the Court reserved the judiciary's
right to require a heightened empirical showing. In particular, a "narrower
scope" for the applicability of the presumption of validity might apply, the
Court indicated, where the enactment under review (I) "restricts those political processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation," (2) is "directed at" particular minorities, or (3) indicates
the operation of prejudice against "discrete and insular minorities."74

· 3. The Rule Favoring Legislative Classifications
The Supreme Court has assiduously deferred to legislative judgments
underlying ordinary social or economic legislation. Although it is surely the
case that Congress and the states err in making factual determinations, and
sometimes fail to make them at all, the Court has invalidated no legislative
enactment ofthis type under rational basis review based upon a supposed lack
of empirical support in the record. 75
Today, of course, the paradigmatic cases arise not under the Due Process
Clause, as they did during the Lochner era, but instead under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Equal Protection Clause
does not authorize courts to "sit as a superlegislature to judge the wisdom or
desirability oflegislative policy determinations. "76 Thus, legislative classifications that do not involve a suspect or quasi-suspect class, or impinge on fundamental rights, are presumed to be constitutional.17 As the Court has noted on
many occasions, the guarantee of equal protection "is not a license for courts
to judge the wisdom, fairness, or logic of legislative choices."78 So long as
there is a theoretical basis for the legislature's choice, the Court will uphold
it. 79 Indeed, those attacking the rationality of a classification must "negative
/d. at 360 n.3 (quoting Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 370 (1983)) (citation omitted).

74. United States v. Carotene Prods. Co.,304 U.S.144, 153 n.4 (1938).
7 S. In fact. the Court has rarely invalidated statutes under the rationality standard for any
reason. See Robert C. Farrell, Successful Rational Basis Claims in the Supreme Court.from the
1971 Term Through Romer v. Evans, 321ND. L. REv. 357,357 (1999) (noting that during past
twenty-five years, Supreme Court has invalidated laws under rationality test on only ten
occasions, while rejecting such claims in one hundred cases).
76. New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976).
77. Lyng v. United Auto. Workers,48S U.S. 360,370 (1988).
78. FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307,313 (1993).
79. See Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456,464 (1981) (upholding
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every conceivable basis which might support it. "80 So long as the issue "is at
least debatable, "81 the courts will defer to the legislature.
The Court has concluded that classifications are matters of degree and
policy, best resolved by a duly elected legislature. Thus, a legislature need not
demonstrate the perfection82 or "mathematical nicety"83 of its choice. In such
matters, the normally counter-majoritarian judiciary places its faith in the
democratic process. The presumption of constitutionality encompasses a
corollary presumption that "absent some reason to infer antipathy, even improvident decisions will eventually be rectified by the democratic process." 84
In other words, the rule of deference to legislative classifications leaves substantial room for Congress, and the states, to err in the process of governing.
Again, the presumption against judicial correction is rooted in the separation
of powers principle; policy is to be "fixed only by the people acting through
their elected representatives."85
Litigants get nowhere in cases measured against a rationality standard by
marshaling impressive empirical evidence to demonstrate that the legislature ·
either erred in predicting the effect of a chosen classification or could not have
actually relied upon the stated reason for the enactment. Under the rule of
rationality, the Court has never required that, in order to withstand an Equal
Protection challenge, a legislature articulate any reasons for enacting a statute.
Nor is there any requirement that the legislature set forth "legislative facts" or
explain its chosen classification "on the record. "86 As the Supreme Court
recently explained, "In other words, a legislative choice is not subject to courtroom fact-finding and may be based on rational speculation unsupported by
evidence or empirical data. "87
Minnesota milk laws); see also Sullivan v. Stroop, 496 U.S. 478,485 (1990) (finding congressional rationale for child support law sufficient); Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587, 600..03
(1987) (same).
80. Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356, 364 (1973) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
81. United States v. Carotene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 154 (1938).
82. See Phillips Chern. Co. v. Dumas Sch. Dist., 361 U.S. 376, 385 (1960) (stating that
"perfection is by no means required").
83. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970) (quoting Lindsley v. Natural
Carbonic Oas Co., 220 U.S. 61,78 (1911)); see also Joseph Tussman & Jacobus tenBrock, The
Equal Protection ofthe Laws, 37 CAL. L. REv. 341,350 (1949) ("[T]he demand for perfection
must inevitably compromise with the hard facts of political life.").
84. Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93,97 (1979).
85. Bhd. of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemcn v. Chicago, Rock Island, & Pacific R.R.,
393 u.s. 129, 138 (1968).
86. FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 315 (1993).
87. /d.

858

59 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 839 (2002)

B. Heightened Record Review for "Novel" and "Implausible" Enactments

Where legislation affects one of the special interests mentioned in footnote four of Carolene Products or otherwise involves circumstances that may
merit "a more searching judicial inquiry," ordinary record review does not
apply. Where legislative power clashes with the Bill of Rights, for instance,
the gravity of the constitutional rights at issue sometimes trumps concerns
about judicial competence or accountability. It is here that judicial skepticism
concerning legislative predicates is sometimes quite high. To put the matter
crudely, the Supreme Court simply does not trust legislatures to do the right
thing in certain contexts. One of the consequences ofjudicial distrust has been
an occasional resort to more stringent record requirements.
It is difficult to determine under which circumstances the Court will apply
heightened record review. One area that may provide some guidance is the
Court's First Amendment jurisprudence.88 Appellate courts, including the
Supreme Court, have traditionally exercised independent judgment with
respect to certain regulations on speech. Such courts have interpreted that
independent judgment to include the power to review de novo not only legal
issues, but factual predicates as well. 89 The path of record review in First
Amendment jurisprudence is highly indetemrinate, and a comprehensive examination of the subject is beyond the scope of this Article. We can, however,
learn something about the phenomenon of heightened record review from First
Amendment cases. The general trend that emerges is that novel exercises of
legislative power, by which is meant expansive interpretations of express
powers or application of those powers in new contexts, often will lead to
heightened record review. 90
88. Although I have chosen to focus on the treatment of empirical matters in First Amendment cases, other areas are characterized by similar trends. The Fourth Amendment "special
needs" cases are just one example. See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 122 S.Ct. 2559, 2567-68
(2002) (upholding random drug testing in public school based on evidence of societal problem
of drug abuse); Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 319 (1997) (invalidating statute requiring
candidates to submit to and pass drug test to qualify for stste office because there was no evidence of drug abuse by candidates).
89. See Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of the United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485,504-10
(1984) (discussing cases in which Court engaged in de novo review of facts found in lower
courts).
90. One commentator who has reviewed the Court's First Amendment cases has concluded that "a host of highly contextual factors" must be consulted to determine whether the
Court will require a substantial empirical showing in defense of any restriction. See William
E. Lee, Manipulating Legislative Facts: The Supreme Court and the Firs/Amendment, 72 TuL.
L. REv. 1261, 1261 (1998). No doubt much depends on the factors Professor Lee has identified. But there is an overarching, ifunststed and indeterminate, philosophy in the cases that is
based upon what might broadly be referred to as judicial trust. This notion fits nicely with the
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The Court has recently articulated a sliding scale of record review in First
Amendment cases. In Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 91 Justice
Souter stated the Court's general philosophy: "The quantuJ.):l of evidence
needed to satisfy heightened judicial scrutiny of legislative judgments will vary
up or down with the novelty and plausibility of the justification raised." 92 In
practice, the approach boils down to judicial distrust or skepticism concerning
the legislature's competence to regulate, its motive in undertaking legislative
action, or both. 93 Judicial skepticism is often articulated in terms of a finding
that the legislature or other governing body did not identify a "real," as opposed
to a conjectural, harm or evil.

1. Generally Accepted Legislative Predicates
Although articulation of the "novelty" and "implausibility" standard is
recent, the practice is well established. The Court has been calibrating review
Court's continued focus on the nature of the medium in First Amendment cases. The Court has
developed a spectrum of First Amendment protection, depending on the specific characteristics
of the medium of expression being regulated. See Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad,
420 U.S. 546,557 (1975) ("Each medium of expression ... may present its own problems.").
Regulation of new industries is, by defmition, a "novel" exercise of legislative power. Not
surprisingly, the record burden rises when new technologies are regulated. Radio, for example,
enjoys limited First Amendment protection, while the Internet, which has no regulatory history
as of yet, enjoys heightened protection.
91. 528 u.s. 377 (2000).
92. Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Oov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377,391 (2000) (emphasis added).
93. Classifications that merit heightened scrutiny have generally been invalidated because
the Court perceives an improper legislative motive, without regard to any legislative record.
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) is a good recent example. In Romer, the Court invalidated a Colorado constitutional amendment which would have prohibited the State of Colorado
or any of its political subdivisions to "adopt or enforce any statute, regulation, ordinance or
policy whereby homosexual, lesbian or bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or relationships
shall constitute· or otherwise be the basis of or entitle any person or class of persons to have or
claim any minority status, quota preferences, protected status or claim of discrimination." !d.
at 625. In his majority opinion striking down the Colorado constitutional amendment, Justice
Kennedy stated: "A law declaring that in general it shall be more difficult for one group of
citizens than for all others to seek aid from the government is a denial of equal protection of the
laws in the most literal sense." !d. at 634. In addition to the text of the Fourteenth Amendment,
Justice Kennedy invoked the spirit of the Equal Protection Clause as well. The Court determined that the Colorado amendment violated the Equal Protection guarantee because it "raise[d]
the inevitable inference that the disadvantage imposed is born of animosity toward the class of
persons affected." Jd. The Court routinely invalidates or sustains legislative stereotypes without
regard to empirical evidence. See generally Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53,73 (2001) (upholding
statute making it more difficult for child born out of wedlock to only one American parent to
establish citizenship if parent was father); United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996)
(invalidating males-only policy at military institute).

860

59 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 839 (2002)

in this manner for some time. Not every law that restricts free speech is subjected to heightened record review. In some circumstances, such as those in
which speech is unprotected or the government purports to regulate speech
based on its "secondary effects" rather than its content, the Court does not ask
whether the legislature sought to remedy a "real" harm, but is content to accept

the barest of factual predicates. 94 Here, as where the legislature exercises
plenary power, the Court simply presumes that there is a factual basis for
legislation. In most such cases, the legislature need not compile a record at all.
Furthermore, when the factual predicate offered to sustain the regulation is at
least debatable, the presumption of validity requires that the Court rule in the
legislature's favor.
When the legislature has been regulating a category of speech for many
years and has established a relationship of trUst with the courts, the Court is
generally disinclined to demand a record in support of legislative predicates.
Nowhere is this more evident than in the Court's review of enactments regulating electoral speech. State regulation of the electoral process dates back at
least to the beginning of the nineteenth century. Both state legislatures and
Congress have long regulated the process of elections, principally to ensure
that contests are fair. 95 Numerous state rules relating to ballot access and the
right to vote in primaries have been before the Supreme Court, and many of
these have survived scrutiny. 96 Recall that in the early Section 5 cases, the
94. See Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 637 (1968) (upholding New York. "hannfuJ
to minol'll" statute); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 486 (1957) (upholding obscenity
statutes without inquiring as to legislature's empirical basis); see also City of Erie v. PAP's
A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 290-91 (2000) (plurality) (upholding ordinance prohibiting nude dancing
under "secondary effects" doctrine). The "secondary effects" doctrine permits regulations under
a less demanding scrutiny if they are aimed at the incidents associated with adult speech.
Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 51-52 (1986). In City ofLos Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 122 S. Ct. 1728 (2002), the Supreme Court continued its pattern oflenient
empiriciam in secondary effects cases. In Alameda Books, the City of Los Angeles adopted a
zoning ordinance in 1977 requiring dispersion of adult establishments. /d. at 1732. In 1983,
the City amended the ordinance to forbid clusters of adult businesses at a single address. /d.
The City's empirical record for the 1983 amendment was thin, consisting of a single judicial
precedent upholding a dispersion ordinance and a 1977 survey. /d. at 1744 (Souter, J., dissenting). The Court nevertheless upheld the cluster ordinance, stati~g:
While the city certainly bears the burden of providing evidence that supports a link
between concentrations of adult operations and asserted secondary effects, it does
not bear the burden of providing evidence that rules out every theory for the link
between concentrations of adult establishments that is inconsistent with its own.
/d. at 1735.
95. CJ Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724,730 (1974) ("[T]here must be a substantial regulation of elections if they are to be fair and honest and if some sort of order, rather than chaos,
is to accompany the democratic processes.").
96. See, e.g., Munro v. Socialist Workers Party, 479 U.S. 189, 194-95 (1986) (upholding
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Court noted Congress's "specially informed legislative competence" in such
matters as voting and elections. 97
One category of electoral restriction that has received a substantial
measure of empirical leeway is limitations on campaign contributions. Here
both Congress and the states have enjoyed wide latitude to restrict contributions to political candidates. In Buckley v. Valeo, 98 the Court upheld limits on
contributions by individuals to any single candidate for federal office. 99 The
Court concluded that unlike expenditure limits on candidates, which were
invalidated in Buckley, contribution limits are not direct limitations on speech
and do not impair the right of association. 100 The Court was satisfied that
Congress passed these restrictions in part to prevent corruption ofthe electoral
process or at least to lessen the appearance that large contributions could buy
access and influence after the election had been decided. This was, of course,
solely a matter of congressional prediction, as the Court did not have before it
a legislative record demonstrating the corrupting influence of large contributions.
The Court continues to be receptive to legislative predictions in this area.
Recently, in Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 101 the Court upheld
state limits on contributions to candidates for state political office. The Government defended the limits as necessary to avoid the corruption, or the perception of corruption, brought about when candidates for public office accept
large campaign contributions} 02 The Eighth Circuit, applying strict scrutiny,
had invalidated the contribution limits for lack of"dernonstrable evidence" that
there were, in fact, problems associated with contributions in excess of the
enacted lirnits. 103 On appeal, the Supreme Court, relying on Buckley, accepted
Washington statute requiring that minor party candidate receive at least one percent of votes
cast in primary election to gain access to general election ballot); Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S.
431, 439-40 (1971) (upholding Georgia law restricting access to ballot to nominees of parties
whose candidates received twenty percent or more of vote at most recent presidential or gubernatorial election or who collected nominating petition signed by five percent of eligible voters);
see also Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 211 (1992) (plurality) (holding that Tennessee
statute prohibiting solicitation of votes and display of campaign materials within 100 feet of
polling place satisfied strict scrutiny, based on "[a] long history, a substantial consensus, and
simple common sense"). The Constitution grants states wide authority to regulate congressional
elections. See U.S. CaNST. art. I, § 2 (choosing representatives); id. art. I,§ 4 (regulation of
time, place, and manner of elections).
97. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641,656 (1966).
98. 424 u.s. 1 (1976).
99. Buckley v. Valeo,424 U.S. 1, 58 (1976).
100. /d. at20-22.
101. 528 u.s. 377 (2000).
102. Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Oov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377,389-90 (2000).
103. Shrink Mo. Oov'tPAC v. Adams, 161 F.3d 519,521 (8th Cir. 1998),rev'd .sub nom.
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the state's justifications with remarkably little in the way of empirical support.
Holding that the limits were not void for "want of evidence," 104 the Court
explained that it did not find the connection between large contributions and
corruption either "novel" or "implausible. "105 Although the Court had "never
accepted mere conjecture as adequate to carry a First Amendment burden,"
Justice Souter wrote, neither was it necessary for the state in all cases to
present a substantial empirical record to support its stated interests. 106
Deference to factual predicates for contribution limits continues to be the
nonn. Last Term, the Court decided Federal Election Commission v. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee, 107 which involved a constitutional challenge by a political party to certain federal campaign spending limits
on "coordinated" party expenditures. The Court again found adequate evidentiary grounds to sustain the limits, stressing the "risk of corruption (and its
appearance). "108 This was so despite the fact that unlimited coordinated
spending - the targeted practice - had never before been permitted. Thus,
there was no available direct evidence that the practice actually led to electoral
corruption. The Court itself was forced to speculate that without the limits on
coordinated expenditures, donors would be able to circumvent contribution
limits} 09
There are other notable examples of the sliding scale of record review
under the First Amendment. For example, the speech of government employees has traditionally been subjected to different First Amendment standards
than speech of the public at large. Although the Supreme Court has struggled
to articulate the parameters of that difference, 110 it has generally accepted that
when the State acts as employer, rather than sovereign, it has broader discretion to regulate speech. There is a long history of government regulation of
even the core speech interests of public employees, extending even to limitations on their participation in political campaigns. 111 The Court has upheld
Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov'tPAC, 528 U.S. 377 (2000).
104. Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Oov'tPAC, 528 U.S. 377,378 (2000).
105. /d.at379.
106. /d.
107.
533 u.s. 431 (2001).
108. FEC v. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 533 U.S. 431,456 (2001).
109. See id. at 464 ("Coordinated expenditures of money donated to a party are tailor-made
to undermine contribution limits.").
110. See Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661,671 (1994) (plurality) (discu99ing substantive
and procedural requirements under First Amendment for regulation of government employee
speech).
111. See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 617-18 (1973) (upholding Oklahoma
statute restricting government employees' political activities); Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330
U.S. 75, 94-97 (1947) (upholding federal law requiring political neutrality for public servants).
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these and other restrictions based upon nothing more than the legislature's
rank speculation concerning the harm that could occur without regulation.
The Court has generally given "substantial weight to government employers'
reasonable predictions of disruption, even when the speech involved is on a
matter of public concern, and even though when the govermnent is acting as
sovereign our review of legislative predictions of harm is considerably less
deferential. "112 Thus, the Court views government employer restrictions as
neither "nover' nor "implausible."

2. Enactments That Are Per Se Novel and Implausible
Two types of legislation impacting First Amendment rights engender
heightened record review. First, blanket prohibitions on truthful speech are
viewed as diminishing the Court's power to construe constitutional meaning
insofar as they are not supported by evidence of a "real" harm. Second, legislation that affects speech rights exercised in the context of new media is per
se novel and often deemed implausible as well.
In Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 113 the Court invalidated
a Virginia statute that made it a crime to divulge infonnation regarding state
judicial review commission proceedings, as applied to a newspaper that published such information. 114 The parties vigorously disputed before the Virginia
Supreme Court whether the Commonwealth, in defending the law, bore an
empirical burden to demonstrate that such publications would cause some
harm to the process ofjudicial discipline, or harm the reputations of the Commonwealth's judges. The Virginia Supreme Court ruled that the Commonwealth did not need to come forward with "hard in-court evidence" to support
these proffered state interests, holding that the mere legislative declaration of
harm was sufficient. 115
The Supreme Court disagreed. It held that the Virginia court had a duty
to "go behind the legislative determination and examine for itself' whether the
asserted interest was compelling. 116 The Court made this oft-cited pronouncement: "Deference to a legislative finding cannot limit judicial inquiry when
First Amendment rights are at stake. "117 The Commonwealth's asserted interests were deemed "implausible" for two reasons. First, as for protecting the
integrity and reputation of the judiciary, the Court held that potential injury to
112. Waters, 511 U.S. at673.
113. 435 u.s. 829 (1978).
114. Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Vuginia, 435 U.S. 829,831-32 (1978).
115. Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Commonwealth,233 S.E.2d 120, 129(Va.1977),
rev'd by435 U.S. 829 (1978).
116. Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Vuginia, 435 U.S. 829,844 (1978).
117. /d. at843.
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judicial reputation was not a sufficient justification for the suppression of
truthful speech. 118 Moreover, the Court rejected the Commonwealth's argument that suppressing speech would protect the integrity of the bench as
counter-intuitive; punishing truthful reporting on judicial matters, the Court
reasoned, could only hann, not enhance, the reputation of the bench. 119 Second, the Court was concerned that by effecting a blanket prohibition on press
coverage of significant issues without evidence of a specific hann, the Commonwealth was relying upon a "legislative definition" of free speech that
would substantially chill commentary critical of the govemment. 120
Virginia's statutory scheme was also seen by the Court as "novel." The
Court recognized the collective wisdom of forty-seven state legislatures, which
had enacted prohibitions similar to the Commonwealth's, that protecting the
confidentiality of judicial misconduct proceedings was a compelling interest.
But only Hawaii and Virginia had chosen criminal sanctions as a means of
furthering the compelling interest, making the Commonwealth's ban a particularly novel one. 121 The novelty of the scheme served only to reinforce the
Court's view that the Commonwealth's reasoning was implausible. The
Commonwealth had come forward with nothing more than "assertion and conjecture" to support its claim that criminal sanctions were necessary to serve the
same interest that other states had furthered with only civil and administrative
penalties} 22
New technologies have given rise to a system of bifurcated review of
legislative predicates. The Court generally presumes that factual predicates
exist for long-regulated media like broadcast television and radio} 23 Only
where Congress appears not to have deliberated at all, failing to express its
"considered judgment" with respect to the purported hann and the efficacy of
its enactment, will the Court openly second-guess Congress's judgrnent. 124 In
those circumstances, at least, the Court is emphatic that it must exercise its
"independent judgment of the facts bearing on an issue of constitutional
law."12s
In contrast to the Court's general comfort with regulation of unprotected
speech, zoned speech, electoral speech, government employee speech, and
118. Jd. at 841.
119. Jd. at 842.
120. Jd. at 844.
121. /d. at 837.
122. Jd. at 841.
123. See, e.g.• FCC v. Pacifica Foundation. 438 U.S. 726, 738 (1978) (upholding declaratory order of Federal Communications Commission that twelve-minute monologue entitled
"Filthy Words," previously delivered to live audience; could be sanctioned if broadcast).
124. Sable Communications of Cal. v. FCC,492 U.S. 115, 130 (1989).
125. Id. at 129.
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historically regulated technologies, attempts to regulate new media - cable
televison, wireless communications, and the Internet - have all encountered
heightened record review. These regulations are, of course, "novel" by their
very nature, and the Court has found many ofthem to be "implausible" as well.
With respect to each, the Court has resorted to the legislative record to determine whether legislative predicates relating to means and ends are entitled to
judicial deference.
Full-blown heightened record review first appeared in the First Amendment area in Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC (l'urner I and II),126 in
which the Court examined whether Congress had sufficient evidence to
support its predictive judgment that proposed "must-carry" rules, imposed on
cable operators under the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, were necessary to preserve local broadcasting. A careful
reading of the Turner cases reveals a Court deeply divided as to the appropriate model to apply to legislative enactments that touch on First Amendment
rights. The Court was concerned that it should give at least as much deference
to Congress's judgments as it does to those of executive agencies. In the end,
although certainly rhetorically deferential, the decisions cannot be deemed
practically so.
The principal issue in the Turner cases was whether Congress had adequately demonstrated the plausibility of its prediction that broadcast companies would be in financial peril without the "must carry" regime, which required cable television systems to devote a portion of their channels to the
transmission oflocal broadcast television stations. In Turner I, the Court was
not satisfied that there was "substantial evidence" in the legislative record,
which included detailed findings, to support Corigress's concerns. The Court
stated, "When the Government defends a regulation of speech as a means to
redress past harms or prevent anticipated harms, it must do more than simply
'posit the existence of the disease sought to be cured. '"127 In this context, the
Court held, Congress must "demonstrate that the recited harms are real, not
merely conjectural, and that the regulation will in fact alleviate these harms in
a direct and material way."128 To enable the Court to exercise its independent
judgment regarding Congress's predictions, the Court remanded to the district
court for additional factual findings.
Eighteen months of additional fact-finding followed the Court's remand,
"yielding a record of tens of thousands of pages" of evidence. 129 No longer
126. Turner Broad. Sys, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994) [hereinafter Turner I]; Turner
Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180 (1997) [hereinafter Turner TI].
127. Turner I, 512 U.S. at 664 (quoting Quincy Cable TV, Inc. v. FCC, 768 F.2d 1434,
1455 (D.C. Cir. 1985)).
128. ld.
129. Turnerll, 520 U.S. at 187 (quoting Turner Broad. v. FCC, 910 F. Supp. 734, 755
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"constrained by the state of the record, "130 which now included not only the
materials gathered during Congress's three years of pre-enactment hearings,
but also "additional expert submissions, sworn declarations and testimony, and
industry documents obtained on remand, "131 the Court in Turner II was finally
able to accept that Congress sought through must-carry rules to further important government interests. The Court held that Congress had sought to regulate
"a real harm" 132 and that its proposed solution alleviated that harm "in a material way." 133 In the Court's view, Congress's record, which the Court treated
as having simply been "supplemented" in the proceedings below,I 34 now
supported its predictive judgment that the must-carry provisions furthered
important government interests and were adequately tailored. 135
Congress was not so fortunate in United States v. Playboy Entertainment
Group, Inc., 136 in which the Court invalidated an attempt to regulate the
phenomenon of "signal bleed," by which households that did not pay to receive
sexually-oriented programming "may happen across discernible images of a
sexually explicit nature."137 The Court invalidated a provision ofthe Telecom(D.D.C. 1995)).
130. !d. at 195.
131. !d. at 187.
132. /d. at 195-96.
133. /d.
134. Id at 200.
135. See id. at 204 (stating that additional evidence from remand supports "Congress's
predictive judgment"). The Court was sh~~~ply divided. Indeed, Justices O'Connor, Scalia,
Ginsburg, and thomas opined that the evidence actually compelled invalidation of the mustcarry rules. /d. at 236 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). The division was also apparent in Denver
Area Educ. Telecommunications Consortium v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727 (1996}, which the Court
decided between the two Turner decisions. A plurality invalidated a provision of the Cable
Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992,47 U.S.C. § 532, that required
cable system operators to segregate "patently offensive" programming, place it on a separate
channel, and block that channel from viewer access unless the viewer requests access in advance
and in writing. This provision, according to the plurality, "does not reveal the caution and care
that the standards underlying [First Amendment doctrine] impose upon laws that seek to
reconcile the critically important interest in protecting free speech with very important, or even
compelling, interests that sometimes warrant restrictions." /d. at 756. The Court lamented the
absence of an "empirical reason" for the restriction and reminded Congress that "this Court has
not been willing to stretch the limits of the plausible, to create hypothetical nonobvious
explanations in order to justify laws that impose significant restrictions upon speech." !d. at
757, 760. The Court upheld a provision of the Act that allowed cable syatem operators to
prohibit the broadcasting of· programming if the operators reasonably believe the material
"describes or depicts sexual or excretory activities or organs in a patently offensive manner."
ld. at768.
136. 529 u.s. 803 (2000).
137. United States v. Playboy Enter. Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803,808 (2000).
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munications Act of 1996 that required cable operators who provide channels
"primarily dedicated to sexually-oriented programming" to either "fully
scramble or otherwise fully block" those channels or to limit their transmission
to hours when children were unlikely to be viewing. 138 Congress added the
provision to the statute by floor amendment, without significant debate, and
the provisions came to the Court with a "near barren"139 legislative record.
The Court found particularly disturbing the absence of a legislative record
showing that children were actually, as opposed to potentially, exposed to
signal bleed and providing some quantification as to how many children were
affected nationwide. 140 The Court hastened to add that it should not be understood "to suggest that a 10,000-page record must be compiled in every case or
that the Government must delay in acting to address a real problem; but the
Government must present more than anecdote and supposition. "141
Efforts to regulate the Internet have come under similar scrutiny. While
Turner I was on remand, Congress enacted the Communications Decency Act
(CDA), 142 its first attempt to regulate speech on the burgeoning Internet. In
Reno v. ACLU/ 43 the Supreme Court invalidated certain provisions of the
CDA that criminalized transmission of "indecent" messages over the Internet.144 The Court was considerably underwhelmed by the amount of legislative attention and deliberation that presaged passage of the CDA. It noted that
the CDA's provisions "were either added in executive committee after the
hearings [on the Telecommunications Act of 1996] were concluded or as
amendments offered during floor debate on the legislation."145 Congress had
spent remarkably little time considering the nature of this new medium146 or
the severity of the criminal penalties it had attached to "indecent" messages. 147
In that context, the Court refused simply to defer to the legislative judgment
that only a total ban on the targeted speech would serve the government's
interest in protecting children from "indecent" materials. 148 The Court said,
138. /d. at 806 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 561(a)).
139. /d. at 822.
140. See id. at 819 (noting that government offered no proof of duration or quality of signal
bleed or of how many children were exposed to signal bleed).
141. Id. at 822.
142. 47 U.S.C. §§ 223(a)-(e) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
143. 521 u.s. 844 (1997).
144. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 885 (1997).
145. Id. at 858~ see also id. n.24 (describing limited legislative pedigree ofCDA).
146. See id. at 868-70 (discussing characteristics of Internet communications).
147. See id. at 878-79 (discussing severity of punishment in certain situations).
148. /d. at 875-76.
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"Particularly in the light of the absence of any detailed findings by the Congress, or even hearings addressing the special problems of the CDA, we are
persuaded that the CDA is not narrowly tailored if that requirement has any
meaning at all." 149
Finally, regulation of wireless communications, such as cellular phones,
has also spawned heightened empirical attention under the First Amendment.
In Bartnicki v. Vopper/ 50 the Court invalidated certain provisions of Title m.
the federal wiretapping statute, that created a civil penalty for intentionally
using or disclosing illegally intercepted wireless communications.lSl Once
again, the Court invalidated the provisions for failing to meet an evidentiary
threshold. The Government had argued that penalties for further disclosure
of intercepted communications would deter initial interceptions by effectively
"drying up the market" for them. 152 It contended that the identity of the interceptor was often unknown and that only by deterrence of this nature would the
government be able to serve its important interest in maintaining the privacy
of wireless communicators.153 The Court rejected the "dry up the market"
theory for lack of evidence. The majority noted that there was little hard
evidence that the identity of the interceptors was unknown. 154 Moreover, the
Court found "no empirical evidence to support the assumption that the prohibition against disclosures reduces the number of illegal interceptions." 155
149. /d. at 879. lnAshcroftv. Free Speech Coalition, 122 S. Ct. 1389 (2002), the Court
again rejected the Government's empirical showing as insufficient to support limits on the transmission of pornography. The Court held that the Child Pornography Prevention Act (CPPA),
which prohibited the dissemination or possession of any visual depiction of sexually explicit
conduct that "is, or appears to be, of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct," or is
"advertised, promoted, presented, described or distributed in such a manner that conveys the
impression" that the material depicts "a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct," violated
the First Amendment. /d. at 1397 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2256) (emphasis added) (internal
quotation marks omitted). The CPPA's prohibition was based on congressional findings and
evidence that, like depictions of sexual activity using actual children, simulated depictions of
sexual activity by children can be used to persuade actual children to participate in such activity;
or to stimulate susceptible adults to sexually exploit real children; or to increase the trade in
pictures of real children engaged in such conduct; or to make it more difficult for law enforcement to identifY and prosecute the use of such materials produced using real children. The
Court concluded that "the causal link is contingent and indirect" because it "depends upon some
unquantified potential for subsequent criminal acts." /d. at 1402.
150. 532 u.s. 514 (2001).
151. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514,523-24 (2001).
152. /d. at529.
153. /d. at 529-30.
154. /d. at 530.
1 SS. /d. at 530-31. Once again, the Court was sharply divided. Justices Rehnquist, Scalia,
and Thomas, who had felt strongly that the record in Turner was deficient, were more than
satisfied with the legislative record in Bartnicki. The dissenters were vocally critical of the
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/JJ. Judicial Review of Congress's Power to Administer the

Civil War Amendments
In a sense, Section 5 and the other enforcement provisions stand at the
crossroads of the Court's heightened record review. On one hand, because
Section 5 is an express power, we would expect ordinary record review to
apply. Indeed, many commentators appear to assume this is the case. We
cannot be certain whether the Court applied ordinary or heightened record
review in cases like South Carolina v. Katzenbach. There was no need to
examine the scope of review because the record that accompanied the Voting
Rights Act of 1965 was by any measure sufficient, particularly in light of the
historical experience that gave rise to it. 156 Even if the empirical record had
not been as strong, we might expect that the combined institutional common
sense of Congress and the Court would have sufficed to support the legislative
predicate. After all, at that time the Court was prepared to defer to Congress
up to the limits of the Necessary and Proper Clause. 157
On the other hand, until recently the Court had not been called upon in
any substantial way to consider Section 5's scope outside the narrow confines
of voting rights in the 1960s.u8 Thus, in certain respects, the Court might
view a spate of modem enactments pursuant to Section 5 as "novel" exertions
of Congress's enforcement power calling for heightened record review. As we
shall see, the Court has come to view a great many of these enactments as
involving "implausible" interpretations of the Constitution. Section 5 is a
special breed of non-plenary express power, one that presupposes the existence of a harm to be remedied. More importantly, the heightened record
review that has been at play in more recent Section 5 cases is intricately tied
to Congress's- and the Court's- power to "say what the law is."
majority's empirical approach. They argued that the Turner substantiality standard, which the
majority apparently applied, actually compelled judicial deference to the government's "dry up
the market" theory. They argued that Congress was institutionally better positioned to make
judgments concerning the effects of a statute, and that the Court was not entitled to replace
legislative predictions with its own. /d. at 550-52 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). The dissenters
characterized the majority's new empirical requirements as "nothing more than the bald
substitution of its own prognostications in place of the reasoned judgment of 41 legislative
bodies and the United States Congress." /d. at 552.
156. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301,308-09 (1966) (discussing history and
legislative background of Act).
157. See id. at 334-35 (noting that "exceptional circumstances" surrounding voting rights
justifY otherwise inappropriate remedies).
158. See Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Equal Protection by Law: Federal Antidiscrimination Legislation After Morrison and Kimel, 110 YALE L. J. 441, 447-49 (2000)(detailing Court's 1960s civil rights cases under Section 5 and Commerce Clause).
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A. Curtailing Congress 's Power Under Article I
Congress traditionally has not had to rely upon Section 5 to protect
constitutional rights. For most of the Nation's history, the Commerce Clause
has authorized a remarkably broad range of enactments, including those which
the Court has come more recently to review under Section 5. Two recent
trends have substantially curtailed Congress's Article I power, causing arenewed focus on Section 5. The first event was the Court's holding in Seminole
Tribe v. F7orida159 that legislation enacted pursuant to Article I could not waive
the States' sovereign immunity from suits by private parties in federal courts. 160
This effectively meant that Congress would have to rely on Section 5 to subject
states to such suits. The second phenomenon is the Court's recent signaling
that it intends to take up once again the difficuh task of establishing the parameters of the Commerce Clause. As the commerce power contracts, Section 5's
significance as a source of congressional power expands.
The commerce power is perhaps the quintessential plenary power in the
legislative arsenal. 161 With the exception of the aforementioned Lochner Era,
the Court historically had deferred to Congress's judgment that an activity had
a sufficient nexus to interstate commerce to come within the commerce power.
Applying ordinary record review, the Court has repeatedly affirmed that
Congress is not required to make any findings in order to legislate under the
Commerce Clause. 162 The presumptive rule was that the factual predicate of
interstate activity existed, whether Congress expressly said so or not. Indeed,
the Court's view was that the presence of a factual predicate could be inferred
from the fact that legislation had been enacted in the first place.
This arrangement works fine so long as Congress does a reasonably good
job of respecting the boundaries ofits admittedly broad authority. But now and
then, an institution granted such sweeping powers will test the boundaries .of
its authority. In United States v. Lopez, 163 the Court negatively reacted to what
it perceived as one such probe of the limits of the commerce power. The
Court's reaction signaled an unwillingness to continue the historical pattern of
wholesale judicial deference to Congress's determination of the scope of the
commerce power.
159. 517U.S.44(1996).
160. See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 72 (1996) (holding that Eleventh
Amendment "prevents congressional authorization" of private suits against states); see also Post
& Siegel, supra note 158, at450-51 (discussing recent sovereign immunity cases).
161. The story of the Commerce Clause is well rehearsed, and this Article will not review
it in any detail. For a brief summary, see Frickey, supra note 4, at 698-701,709-20.
162. See Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 156 (1971) (stating that Congress need not
"make particularized findings" of effect on interstate commerce to legislate).
163. 514 u.s. 549 (1995).
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In Lopez, the Court refused to defer to Congress's implicit judgment in
the Gun Free School Zones Act that possession of a handgun within a school
zone "substantially affected" interstate commerce. The Court asserted its
supremacy as interpreter of the Constitution. Whether an activity "substantially affects" interstate commerce so as to come within the commerce power,
the Court said, "is ultimately a judicial rather than a legislative question, and
can be settled finally only by this Court."164 Fair enough, it would seem, but
by what standard would the question be settled and on what evidentiary
showing?
The Lopez Court agreed with the Government that "Congress normally
is not required to make fonnal findings as to the substantial burdens that an
activity has on interstate commerce."165 But the Court was quick to remind
Congress that ''to the extent that congressional findings would enable us to
evaluate the legislative judgment that the activity in question substantially
affected interstate commerce, even though no such substantial effect was
visible to the naked eye, they are lacking here. "166 Recall that the empirical
model advanced in Carolene Products included an "aid to judicial function"
component. In that sense, at least, Lopez broke no new ground. It simply
affirmed the unremarkable proposition that where the effect of a particular
activity is not apparent from the statutory text, to the "naked eye," findings
may aid judicial review.
Although the majority hesitated to frame the debate as one concerning the
division between national and state power, federalism concerns plainly had a
great deal to do with the Court's admonition about congressional findings.
Absent findings on the substantial effect on interstate commerce, the Court
said, it was troubled by the breadth ofthe Government's position. 167 If Congress's purpose was not, as the Court plainly suspected, to intrude on local
affairs, but truly to regulate an activity that affected in some meaningful way
commerce among the states, then surely it would mark no judicial intrusion to
ask that Congress set forth some rudimentary findings. The Lopez Court did
not require that Congress come forward with an empirical record demonstrating the truth of its findings. Nor did the Court ultimately strike the enactment
on the ground that findings had not been made. The Court merely implied that
such findings may be useful when Congress legislates at the margin of its
164. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 557 n.2 (1995) (quoting Heart of Atlanta
Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241,273 (1964) (Black, J., concurring) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
165. /d. at 562 (emphasis added).
166. /d. at 563.
167. See id. at 564 (stating tltat "it is difficult to perceive any limitation on federal power"
under Government's arguments).
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commerce power. 168 Although the breadth ofLopez's holding and its effect on
future exercises of the commerce power are still unclear, the case at least
signals the Court's view that there are limits to congressional authority under
the Commerce Clause.
Justices Kennedy and O'Connor, who concurred in Lopez, were perhaps
more honest in their assessment. Although they were somewhat troubled by
the doctrinal path the Court seemed to be embracing,169 these justices saved
most of their criticism for Congress. They challenged legislators to embrace
the responsibility of preserving and respecting the balance of federal and state
power when regulating commerce. Justice Kennedy reasoned that the "absence of structural mechanisms" to require legislators to do so, and the "momentary political convenience often attendant upon their failure to do so, argue
against a complete renunciation of the judicial role. "170 Justice Kennedy
acknowledged the many difficulties in identifying any consistent and workable
standard from the line of Commerce Clause decisions, but rested on the notion
that the Court had a "distinctive duty" to "declare what the law is. "171 He
concluded, "The statute before us upsets the federal balance to a degree that
renders it an unconstitutional assertion of the commerce power, and our
intervention is required. "172
Justice Souter's dissent is a sharp rebuke to the Court. He notes that the
Court traditionally defers to "what is often a merely implicit congressional
judgment that its regulation addresses a subject substantially affecting interstate commerce. "173 The restraint the Court has exercised, according to Justice
Souter, "reflects our respect for the institutional competence of the Congress
on a subject expressly assigned to it by the Constitution and our appreciation
of the legitimacy that comes from Congress's political accountability in
dealing with matters open to a wide range of possible choices." 174 He noted
168. /d. at 563. It should be noted that the Court focused on a number offactors, including
the lack of findings. Also singled out were the lack of nexus between interstate commerce and
an in-state activity, and Congress's apparent attempt to regulate a traditional state activity or a
non-profit, noncommercial activity. /d. at 559-61.
169. See id. at 568 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (stating that history of Commerce Clause
"counsels great restraint" before finding legislation to be invalid exercise of commerce power);
see also id. at 574 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (stating that "[s)tare decisis operates with great
force in counseling" against questioning "essential principles" of Congress's power to regulate
commercial transactions).
170. /d. at 578 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
171. /d. at 579 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (quoting Marbury v. Madison, S U.S. (1 Cranch)
137, 177 (1803)).
172. /d. at 580 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
173. /d. at 603 (Souter, J., dissenting).
174. /d. at 604 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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that the deference principle in Commerce Clause cases 11 developed only after
one of this Court's most chastening experiences, when it perforce repudiated
an earlier and untenably expansive conception ofjudicial review in derogation
of congressional commerce power. 11175
With respect to the majority's reference to the absence of factual findings,
Justice Souter saw the Court poised to 11 ignor[e] the painful lesson learned in
193 7, 11176 and foresaw further derogation of rationality review under the Commerce Clause. 177 He recognized that 11 [i]t is only natural to look for help with
a hard job, and reviewing a claim that Congress has exceeded the commerce
power is much harder in some cases than in others. 11178 But Justice Souter
insisted that the appropriate approach was to apply the traditional deference
rule, which requires only that the legislative choice appear on the face of the
statute to be a reasonable one. No matter that the statute was silent or ambiguous; courts were simply to infer the presence of a factual predicate from the
fact that the legislation was passed. 179 Congress's findings, Justice Souter
noted, address only what the legislature did in fact find, not all that Congress
rationally could have found. 180 If findings were to be required, he said, 11 something other than rationality reyiew would be afoot. 11181 Of course, Justice
Souter noted, Congress would earn the Court's thanks for making detailed
findings, 11 [b]ut thanks do not carry the day as long as rational possibility is the
touchstone. 11182
Justice Breyer, who authored the principal dissent in Lopez, saw the
majority opinion as a major departure from the Court's Commerce Clause
jurisprudence, and he darkly warned of a return to the mistakes of the past. 183
Justice Breyer took issue with the 11 substantial effects .. formulation, noting that
the Court had never consistently applied this standard in its Commerce Clause
cases. 184 Invoking the rationality rule, Justice Breyer opined that courts must
give Congress wide discretion in determining whether the requisite effect is
175. /d. (Souter, J., dissenting).
176. /d. at 609 (Souter, J., dissenting).
177. See id. at 611 (Souter, 1., dissenting) (stating that review may "degenerate into the sort
of substantive policy review" overruled by New Deal Court).
178. Id. at 612 (Souter, J., dissenting).
179. Id. at 613 (Souter, J., dissenting).
180. /d. (Souter, J., dissenting).
181. /d. (Souter, J., dissenting).
182. /d. at 614 (Souter, 1., dissenting).
183. See id. at 631 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (stating that upholding Act would accord with
traditional view of Commerce Clause with exception of "one wrong tum subsequently corrected").
184. See id. at 615-16 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (detailing articulation of "substantial effects"
test).

874

59 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 839 (2002)

present, "both because the Constitution delegates the commerce power directly
to Congress and because the detennination requires an empirical judgment of
a kind that a legislature is more likely than a court to make with accuracy." 185
The absence of findings, Justice Breyer wrote, "at most, deprives a statute of
the benefit of some extra leeway." 186 To invalidate the statute on the ground
that Congress did not produce detailed findings concerning the source of its
authority, he said, "would appear to elevate form over substance. "187

B. Heightened Scrutiny Under Section 5: Measuring "Congruence
and Proportionality"
As a result of Congress's diminished ability to waive the states' immunity
and the possible scaling back of the commerce power, Section 5 has played an
increasingly prominent role in the Court's separation-of-powers jurisprudence.188 Although the Rehnquist Court declined to require even findings of
fact in Lopez, it has consistently demanded far more under Section 5. A
heightened record review has been incorporated into the Court's review of
Section 5 enactments. The Court treats Section 5 enactments much the same
as those enactments which, under the First Amendment, are considered per se
"novel" and "implausible." The Court has invalidated a number of Section 5
enactments on the ground that Congress failed to provide a sufficient legislative record. There is, however, a significant distinction concerning the relevant
predicate. The predicate that is being reviewed under Section 5 does not
belong to Congress. Rather, the Court proceeds in two discrete steps to dismantle Section 5 enactments: first, the Court redefines the relevant evil or
harm, and then it inevitably finds that there is insufficient support for the judicially defined predicate.
Modem Section 5 jurisprudence begins with City ofBoerne v. Flores. 189
In City ofBoerne, the Court invalidated the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
(RFRA). 190 The RFRA was Congress's response to Employment Division,
Department ofHuman Resources v. Smith, 191 a decision in which the Court
held that it would not subject neutral, generally applicable laws to strict scrutiny, even when the laws, as applied, severely burdened the exercise of reli185. /d. at 617 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
186. /d. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
187. /d. at 618 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
188. See Post & Siegel, supra note 158, at 448-50 (discussing need for using Section 5 to
uphold civil rights legislation in light of Lopez and Morrison).
189. 521 u.s. 507 (1997).
190. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997).
191. 494 u.s. 872 (1990).
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gion. 192 Congress reasoned that only by subjecting these laws to rigorous
scrutiny could the courts uncover otherwise hidden improper motives. Its
intent in enacting the RFRA could not have been more transparent; the statute
itself stated that one of its primary purposes was to "restore the compelling
interest test ... and to guarantee its application in all cases where free exercise of religion is substantially burdened." 193 .
Paying homage to its early precedents in the area, the Court began in City
ofBoerne with the recognition that Section 5 was a broad, "positive grant of
legislative power." 194 The Court also acknowledged that Congress was to be
chiefly responsible for enforcing the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment: "It is for Congress in the first instance to 'determin[e] whether and
what legislation is needed to secure the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment.' and its conclusions are entitled to much deference. "195 Indeed, the
Court was willing to go so far as to reaffirm that "[l]egislation which deters
or remedies constitutional violations can fall within the sweep of Congress's
enforcement power even if in the process it prohibits conduct which is not
itself unconstitutional. "196
But, the Court said, there are limits to even the broadest express powers.
In particular, the Court found in the word "enforce" a textual limitation on
Congress's broad powers under Section 5. According to the Court's reading,
"[t]he design of the Amendment and the text of § 5 are inconsistent with the
suggestion that Congress has the power to decree the substance of the Fourteenth Amendment's restrictions on the States."197 The Court stated that
although the "line between measures that remedy or prevent unconstitutional
actions and measures that make a substantive change in the governing law is
not easy to discern, and Congress must have wide latitude in detennining
where it lies, the distinction exists and must be observed." 198 The Court then
instituted the following standard for detennining on which side of that line an
enactment should be placed: "There must be a congruence and proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to
that end." 199 Without this tailoring, the Court said, "legislation may become
substantive in operation and effect. "200
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.

Emplo~ent Div., Dept

of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 885 (1990).
City ofBoerne, 521 U.S. at 515 (quoting42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)).
/d. at 517 (quoting Ka1zenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641,651 (1966)).
/d. at 536 (quoting Ka1zenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641,651 (1966)).
/d.at518.
/d. at519.
/d. at 519-20.
/d. at 520 (emphasis added).
/d.
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Under this newly announced framework, the Court unanimously rejected,
with some measure of righteous indignation, the notion that Congress could
simply disagree with the Court's interpretation of the scope or definition of the
constitutional guarantees in question and codify its own interpretation. That
would have been quite enough to invalidate the statute. But the Court went on
to indicate that "[t]he appropriateness of remedial measures must be considered
in light of the evil presented. "201 In other words, there must be a record of
"congruence and proportionality" in support of any Section 5 enactment. Not
surprisingly, the Court could not find in the record any evidence to support
Congress's prediction that application of strict scrutiny to generally applicable
laws would unearth invidious religious bias. 202 If evidence of a pattern of
discriminatory state laws existed, Congress had apparently rejected a strategy
that would have resulted in its compilation. Having chosen instead a frontal
attack on the supremacy of the Court's power to declare finally the meaning of
the Constitution, Congress had compiled no record for the Court to review. 203
It was not long before the Court had occasion to apply its newly minted
"congruence and proportionality" standard. In Florida Prepaid Postsecondary
Education Expense Board v. College Savings Bank, 204 the Court invalidated an
attempt by Congress to abrogate states' Eleventh Amendment immunity under
the Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act of 1992. 205
Congress had enacted the Patent Remedy Act under the Patent Clause, the
Commerce Clause, and Section 5. 206 The Court had foreclosed any reliance on
Article I powers for a congressional waiver of state sovereign immunity in
Seminole Tribe ofF/orida. 200 Thus, if the Patent Remedy Act provisions were
to be upheld, it would have to be under Section 5.
Applying its new "congruence and proportionality" standard, the Court
held that to abrogate state immunity to enforce patent property rights under the
Due Process Clause, Congress would have to demonstrate not only that the
states had actually infringed many patents, but also that there were no adequate
201. /d. at 530.
202. See id. at 532 (concluding that RFRA is so disproportionate that it cannot be "understood" to remedy or prevent unconstitutional conduct).
203. See Devins, supra note 12, at 1196-97 (concluding that "Congress gave short shrift
to factfinding in order to do precisely what RFRA's interest group sponsors asked for, that is,
repudiate Smith").
204.
527 u.s. 627 (1999).
205. 35 U.S.C. §§ 271(h), 296(a) (1994).
206. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coli. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 63536 (1999).
207. See id. at 636 (finding that under Seminole Tribe, Act cannot be sustained under
Commerce Clause or Patent Clause).
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remedies at state law. 208 The Court first examined the "evil" Congress purported to address in the Patent Remedy Act. It found little proof of "widespread and persisting" patent violations by the states. 209 The evil identified,
according to the Court, was nothing more than "speculative hann," an insufficient predicate for Section 5 legislation. 210 Moreover, as a matter of constitutional definition, the Court stated that only state deprivations of patent rights
without due process would amount to a constitutional violation. 211 Because
Congress had "barely considered" whether state remedies for patent infringement were adequate and had failed to focus on instances of intentional, as
opposed to merely negligent, patent infringement by the states, there was no
evidence in the record that the states had engaged in conduct that implicated
the Due Process Clause. 212 Thus, the Court found no "plausible argument" that
the states had deprived patentees of property and left them without adequate
remedies ?13 Justice Stevens, writing for the four dissenters, argued to the
contrary that Congress had in fact compiled a substantial legislative record in
support of the need for abrogation of state immunity to protect against state
infringements of patent rights. 214 ·
In Kimel v. Florida Board ofRegents/15 the same five-Justice majority
that had invalidated the RFRA and the state suit provisions of the Patent
Remedy Act held that Congress did not have the power under Section S to
enforce the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA)216 by
authorizing federal damage suits by state employees against the states as
sovereigns, which Congress attempted to do in 1974 revisions to the ADEA. 217
The Court had previously upheld the extension ofthe ADEA to state and local
governments under the Commerce Clause. 218 However, because the Court had
later held in Seminole Tribe that Congress lacks the power to waive sovereign
immunity by exercising its Article I powers, Congress again had to tum to
SectionS as its source ofpower. 219
208. /d. at 642.
209. /d. at 645 (quoting City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507,526 (1997)).
210. /d.at641.
211. /d.at642-43.
212. /d. at643,645.
213. /d. at 647.
214. See id. at 656-59 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting legislative fmdings that state patent
infringement was likely to increase and that state universities were heavily involved in patent
system and needed to be regulated).
215. 528 u.s. 62 (2000).
216. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
217. Kimel v. Fla. Bd. ofRegents, 528 U.S. 62,91 (2000).
218. EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 243 (1983).
219. See Kimel, 528 U.S. at 80 (stating that plaintiffs may maintain ADEA suits only if
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In what had become a familiar pattern, the Court first set the parameters
of its inquiry. It reiterated that "Congress' [s] § 5 power is not confined to the
enactment of legislation that merely parrots the precise wording of the Fourteenth Amendment." 22° Congress could remedy or prohibit "a somewhat
broader swath of conduct," the Court noted, "including that which is not itself
forbidden by the Amendment's text. "221 But the Court again affirmed that "the
same language that serves as the basis for the affirmative grant of congressional power also serves to limit that power. "222 As the Court had made plain in
City of Boerne, because the "ultimate interpretation and determination of the
Fourteenth Amendment's substantive meaning remains the province of the
Judicial Branch," Congress's power under Section 5 did not extend to measures by which it intended to decree the substance of the constitutional guarantee.223
The Government argued that the Court could uphold the ADEA state-suit
provision as a remedy for past and present discrimination by states on the basis
of age in violation ofthe Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. 224
But the Court was highly skeptical of that. claim, principally because its own
precedents failed to grant "suspect class" status on the basis ofage. 225 Rather,
the Court noted, age classifications are "presumptively rational. "226 Against
this "backdrop" of Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence, the Court readily
concluded that the ADEA failed the "congruence and proportionality" test.
The Court specifically rejected the argument that the ADEA provisions, when
read in the context of certain statutory exceptions, targeted only arbitrary age
discrimination, which in most cases would violate the Fourteenth Amendment.227
To ascertain whether the ADEA provision was proportional to the "evil"
Congress found to exist, the Court examined the legislative record. On the
Court's reading of the record, the state-suit provision was "an unwarranted
response to a perhaps inconsequential problem. "228 The Court dismissed the
evidence presented- "assorted sentences ... from a decade's worth of congressional reports and floor debates" and a dated California report on age disADEA is valid exercise of Section 5 power).
220. /d. at 81.
221. /d.
222. /d.
223. !d. (citing City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507,536 (1997)).
224. /d. at 86-88.
225. /d. at 83.
226. /d. at 84.
227. /d. at 86-88.
228. /d. at 89.
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crimination in public agencies - as failing to demonstrate a sufficient problem
of unconstitutional discrimination based on age. 229 The Court took pains to
emphasize that the lack of record evidence was not dispositive. Nevertheless,
the absence of a substantial record of a "widespread pattern of age discrimination by the States" confirmed for the Court that Congress "had no reason to
believe that broad prophylactic legislation was necessary in this field." 230
Soon after Kimel, the Court invalidated a provision of the Violence
Against Women Act (VAWA)231 that provided a federal civil remedy to victims
of gender-motivated violence. In United States v. Morrison, 232 the Court first
held, based on Lopez, that Congress did not have the authority to enact the
VAWA provisions under its Article I commerce power. 233 It then turned to
what it termed the "well settled" Section 5 standard of congruence and proportionality. 234 After again reaffinning that Section 5 permits Congress to prohibit
conduct the Court itself has not deemed unconstitutional, the Court addressed
the state ofthe legislative record before Congress. 235 The Court noted that the
government pointed to a "voluminous congressional record" of "pervasive
bias" against women in various state justice systems. 236 If all that was required
was evidence of gender discrimination, Congress had come forward with an
abundant record.
Again, however, the problem in Morrison was not the weight of the
evidence of discrimination, but its specific substance. In particular, the Court
narrowly interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment to apply only to violations by
state actors. 237 For that proposition, the Court reached all the way back to
United States v. Harris 238 and the Civil Rights Cases. 239 According to the
Court, stare decisis demanded that the Court enforce the state action limitation
announced in these early cases,240 an assertion that ignores both history and
229. /d. at 90-91.
230. /d.
231. 42 u.s.c. § 13981(b)(l994).
232. 529 u.s. 598 (2000).
233. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598,617 (2000). Although the Court conceded
that Congress supported VAWA's remedial provisions with detailed findings, it held that this
alone was not sufficient to sustain the Act under the Commerce Clause. See id. at 614 ("But the
existence of congressional findings is not sufficient, by itself, to sustain the constitutionality of
Commerce Clause legislation.").
234. /d. at619.
235. /d.at619-20.
236. /d.
237. !d. at621.
238.
106 u.s. 629 (1883).
109 u.s. 3 (1883).
239.
240. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 622 (2000) (stating that stare decisis is

880

59 WASH & LEE L. REV. 839 (2002)

precedent. 241 Thus, even assuming that the legislative record relating to
VAWA contained substantial evidence of state discrimination based on
gender, the fact that its prohibitions affected private actors robbed it of "congruence and proportionality," in the Court's view.
·
In Board ofTrustees v. Garrett, 242 the same familiar five-Justice majority
invalidated the state-suit provision of the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA). 243 The majority again acknowledged that "Congress is not limited to
mere legislative repetition of this Court's constitutional jurisprudence. "244
The power to "enforce" Section I of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court
wrote, "includes the authority both to remedy and to deter violation of rights
guaranteed thereunder by prohibiting a somewhat broader swath of conduct,
including that which is not itself forbidden by the Amendment's text." 245 The
Court reaffirmed, however, that "it is the responsibility of this Court, not
Congress, to define the substance of constitutional guarantees. "246
The Court for the first time expressly separated into two steps the "congruence and proportionality" standard for analyzing Section 5 enactments that
reach beyond the "actual guarantees" ofthe Fourteenth Amendment. First, the
Court sought to "identify with some precision the scope of the constitutional
right at issue. "247 The Court did that by looking at its prior decisions under the
Equal Protection Clause dealing with the rights of the disabled. That review
demonstrated that the disabled enjoyed only minimal constitutional protection
as a group. 248 Thus, "[s]tates are not required by the Fourteenth Amendment
to make special accommodations for the disabled, so long as their actions
towards such individuals are rational. "249
especially strong due to Justices deciding Harris and Civil Rights Cases).
241. See Post & Siegel, supra note 158, at 474-77 (criticizing.Court's reasoning on this
point); see also District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418, 424 n.8 (1973) (adopting view
that Congress acting under Section 5 may regulate private conduct that Fourteenth Amendment
standing alone does not reach).
242. 531 u.s. 356 (2001).
243. 42 u.s.c. §§ 12111-12117 (1994).
244. Bd. ofTrs. v. Garrett. 531 U.S. 356,365 (2001).
245. /d. (quoting Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 81 (2000)).
246. /d.
247. /d.
248. /d. at 366-68.
249. /d. at 367. Garrett thus might answer some of the questions that commentators felt
the Court had left open in Kimel and Mo"ison. See Post & Siegel, supra note 158, at 443
("After Kimel, for example, it is uncertain whether and to what extent Congress can exercise its
power under Section 5 to redress forms of discrimination that differ from those that courts
prohibit in cases arising under Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment.").
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Second, having determined the "metes and bounds of the constitutional
right in question," the Court proceeded to ask "whether Congress identified
a history and pattern of unconstitutional employment discrimination by the
States against the disabled. "250 Although Congress did make a general finding
in the ADA of historical discrimination against the disabled, the Court noted
that most ofthis discrimination was carried out by private actors, not states.251
In any event, the Court could not find in the record any evidence of a pattern
of unconstitutional state action against the disabled. In that regard, the Court
compared the ADA's record with the record that accompanied the Voting
Rights Act of 1965.252 In contrast to the care and consideration that went into
the compilation of the Voting Rights Act record, the Court saw little evidence
to support Congress's judgment that a national remedial measure against the
states was necessary to cure the evil of state discrimination against the nation's disabled persons. 253 The ADA, according to the Court, would permit
Congress to "rewrite the Fourteenth Amendment law" that had been established in the Court's own precedents. 254
Justice Breyer, writing on behalf of the now equally familiar group of
dissenters, 255 accused the majority of blurring the constitutional separation of
powers with its empirical standards. He criticized the majority for reviewing
the legislative record "as if it were an administrative agency record." 256 The
dissent also criticized the majority's approach for requiring Congress to
assemble a record that would support a judicial finding of state discrimination. The dissenters pointedly observed that "a legislature is not a court of
law."257
In addition to their disagreement regarding the proper separation of
powers, the dissent's view of the record could not have been more different
than that of Chief Justice Rehnquist and the majority. According to the
dissent, Congress had compiled a "vast legislative record" documenting
instances of unlawful discrimination against the disabled. 258 The dissent noted
that Congress had held thirteen hearings and had relied on "its own prior
250. Bd. ofTrs. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356,360 (2001).
251. /d. at369.
252. /d. at373-74.
253. Jd.
254. /d. at 374.
255. Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg joined the dissent. /d. at 376 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
256. /d. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
257. /d. at 379-80 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
258. /d. at 377 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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experience gathered over forty years during which it contemplated and enacted considerable similar legislation."259 The dissent also pointed to "roughly
300 examples of discrimination by state governments" in the record, which
they collected and presented in an appendix to their opinion.260 Of course,
they acknowledged that many of these examples were anecdotal in nature.
But the dissent stated: "Congress, unlike courts, must, and does, routinely
draw general conclusions ..,.. for example, of likely motive or of likely relationship to legitimate need - from anecdotal and opinion-based evidence of this
kind, particularly when the evidence lacks strong refutation." 261 Nor, the
dissent noted, has the Court "traditionally required Congress to make findings
as to state discrimination, or to break down the record evidence, category by
category."262
In addition to the many instances of unlawful discrimination they found
in the record, the dissenters also noted Congress's express, detailed findings
of discrimination against persons with disabilities. 263 In their view, these
findings, and the evidence of record, bore out Congress's conclusion that the
states had engaged in a pattern of discrimination that violated the Equal Protection Clause. 264 After reviewing the record materials, the dissent remarked
that "[t]he Court's failure to find sufficient evidentiary support may well rest
upon its decision to hold Congress to a strict, judicially created evidentiary
standard. "26s Justice Breyer argued that this strict standard was at odds with
the Court's institutional role and with the resulting traditional deference to
Congress266 and that it seemed reminiscent of the Court's "now-discredited"
Lochner Era jurisprudence.267 The dissenters stated that the "problem with the
Court's approach is that neither the 'burden of proof that favors States nor
any other rule of restraint applicable to judges applies to Congress when it
exercises its § 5 power." 268 The four dissenting justices concluded that "[t]he
Court, through its evidentiary demands, its non-deferential review, and its
259. /d. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
260. /d. at 379 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also id. app. Cat 391424.
261. /d. at380(Breyer,J.,dissenting).
262. !d. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
263. /d. at 380-81 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
264. /d. at 381-82 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
265. /d. at 382 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
266. See id. at 387 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("And even today, the Court purports to apply,
·not to depart from, these [deferential] standards. But the Court's analysis and ultimate conclusion deprive its declarations of practical significance. The Court 'sounds the word of promise
to the ear but breaks it to the hope.'" (citations omitted)).
267. /d. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
268. Id at 383 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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failure to distinguish between judicial and legislative constitutional competencies, improperly invades a power that the Constitution assigns to Congress. "269

IV. Judicial Review ofAgency Statutory Constructions
Under Section 5, the Court reviews Congress's enforcement enactments
for "appropriateness." The Court uses the benchmarks of "congruence and
proportionality" to separate valid remedial legislation from enactments that
would effect a substantive change in the law. Thus far, the Rehnquist Court
has rejected as inappropriate all legislative enactments that purport to enforce
the Fourteenth Amendment beyond the letter of the Court's own precedents.
Congress has essentially been prohibited from addressing "enforcement gaps"
under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Establishing rules for reviewing enforcement gaps is not an entirely new
enterprise for the Court. Executive agencies have long filled enforcement gaps
in federal statutes that, like constitutional text, are often silent or ambiguous.
Agencies enforce statutes in a variety of ways. For example, they may bring
specific enforcement actions under a statutory scheme or may adjudicate rights
pursuant to a statute. Agencies also enforce ambiguous statutes by filling gaps
in statutory text through interpretation of the statutory language. For many
years now, the presumptive rule of review has been that all reasonable or
permissible constructions are valid. Only recently has the Rehnquist Court
begun to reclaim much of the independent judgment it had ceded to agencies
to "say what the law is."
A. Chevron and the "Province of the Judiciary"

As it has done recently under Section 5 with regard to Congress, the Court
has struggled to define proper boundaries of review of legal interpretations
offered by executive agencies. Many articles have charted the path of judicial
deference in this area,270 and this Article will not repeat the history in any
detail. Prior to 1984, the Court had a difficult time deciding whether to check
agency interpretations by exercising its own, independent judgment with
regard to their validity or rather to leave the matter of construction of ambiguous federal statutes almost entirely to agencies considered expert in the particular field. 271
269.
270.

Id. at 388-89 (Breyer, J., dissenting).

See, e.g., Leslie E. Gerwin, The Deference Dilemma: Judicial Responses to the Great
Legislative Power Giveaway, 14 HAsTINGS CONST. L.Q. 289,301-05 (1987).
271. See I KENNE1H C1JLp DAVIS & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRA11VE LAW
TREATISE § 3.1 (3d ed. 1994) (explaining Court's use of both deference and substituted
judgment in pre-Chevron review of agency decisions); Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpreta-
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Since the Court decided it in 1984, Chevron US.A., Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc. 212 has been the paradigm for judicial review
of agency interpretations of the federal statutes that agencies are charged with
enforcing.213 Following Chevron, lower courts analyze agency legal interpretations in two discrete steps. At Step One, the court is to ask "whether Congress
has directly spoken to the precise question at issue. "274 This is a narrow rule.
It requires not only that Congress consider and speak to a broad subject area,
but that the issue under consideration be the "precise" question to which the
parties' arguments are addressed. If Congress has so spoken, and has done so
clearly, the court "must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of
the Congress. "275
Step Two comes into play only if the statute at issue is silent or ambiguous as to the specific question being considered. At Step Two, the presumptive rule is that the agency has the power to interpret ambiguous laws it has
been "entrusted to administer." 276 This of course begs the question of when an
agency has been entrusted with such power. Under Chevron, the agency has
been "entrusted to administer" a statute so long as Congress has left gaps in the
text. The apparent rationale for this principle is that by leaving the matter
unresolved, Congress intended that the agency fill in any gaps through future
interpretations. The judicial inquiry is severely bounded at Chevron's Step
Two: the court determines only whether the agency's interpretation of law "is
based on a permissible construction ofthe statute. "277 Ifthe agency's construction is permissible or "reasonable," the court must defer, giving the agency's
interpretation "controlling weight unless [it is] arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute. "278 Chevron deference applies even if the
agency's interpretation is not the one "the court would have reached if the
question initially had arisen in a judicial proceeding. "279
The "normative core" of Chevron's Step Two is similar to the core of the
presumptive rule in favor of legislative predicates in most constitutional
lion and the Balance ofPower in the Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 452, 454 (1989)
(detailing "independent judgment model" and "deferential model" of court review).
272. 467 u.s. 837 (1984).
273. See Jim Rossi, Respecting Deference: Conceptualizing Skidmore Within the Architecture ofChevron. 42 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1105, 1113-14 (2001) (detailing Chevron deference).
274. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984).
275. !d. at 843.
276. !d. at 844.
277. !d. at 843.
278. /d. at 844.
279. !d. at 843 n.11.
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cases - 11an appreciation of agency expertise, the limits of the specialized
knowledge of judges, and political accountability. 11280 As Justice Stevens
noted in Chevron: 11Judges are not expert in the field, and are not part of
either political branch of the Government. 11281 And although agencies lack the
same measure of accountability as Congress, the President, who is accountable, controls agency choices to a degree. Thus, it is 11 entirely appropriate for
this political branch of the Government to make such policy choices- resolving the competing interests which Congress itself either inadvertently did not
resolve, or intentionally left to be resolved by the agency charged with the
administration of the statute in light of everyday realities. 11282
Because it cedes so much ofthe interpretive function to agencies, Chevron
has been described as the 11counter-Marbury11 for the administrative state.283
The judiciary's duty to 11 say what the law is 11 gives way to all reasonable agency
interpretations of ambiguous or silent statutes. Although the Administrative
Procedure Act expressly entrusts legal issues to the judiciary,284 the Chevron
Court determined that agencies, given their institutional expertise, have the
ability to 11reconcil[e] conflicting policies 11 and to comprehend regulatory
schemes that are often 11technical and complex. 11285 Thus, if a challenge, 11fairly
conceptualized, .. arises questioning the wisdom of the agency's choice of
policy, Chevron dictates that the challenge must fail. 286 Put another way, courts
are not permitted to second-guess the policy choices made by more accountable
or more expert political branches. As the Court emphasized in Chevron,
11
[t]ederal judges- who have no constituency- have a duty to respect legitimate
policy choices made by those who do. 11287
A spirited debate followed the Chevron decision concerning the merit of
its core presumption that Congress ·intended to leave enforcement gaps for
agencies to flesh out in their own interpretations and the degree to which the
decision cedes judicial power to 11 say what the law is. 11 Some commentators
doubt that congressional silence or ambiguity can be stretched so far, 288
280. Rossi, supra note 273, at 1114.
281. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865.
282. Id. at 865~.
283. Sunstein, supra note 11, at 2074-75.
284. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2XA) (2000) (providing that purely legal questions be reviewed
de novo).
285. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865.
286. Id. at 866.
287. Id.
288. See, e.g., Farina, supra note 271, at 469-76 (criticizing application of presumption
under Chevron Step Two).
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whereas others argue that acceptance of Chevron's presumption will promote
uniformity and certainty. 289 Other commentators have questioned prescribing
Chevron's strong medicine in light of what might be considered an "incompletely theorized" 290 opinion, which sheds less light on the reasons for judicial
deference than many perhaps would wish. Interest in the "scope" or "domain".
of Chevron deference has been on the rise for some time and has recently
reached a crescendo in the commentary. 291
Much of the doubt stems, of course, from the uncertain provenance of
executive agencies in a democratic constitutional system. The common argument is that agencies are less accountable than Congress and are subject to
"capture" by special interests. Thus, insofar as Chevron's Step Two rests on
the notion that agencies are more accountable than courts, its normative core
seems dubious, or even illegitimate. In addition, some believe that a deference
rule that cedes so much power to agencies where Congress has not clearly
expressed its intention derogates, rather than supports, the constitutional
separation of powers. How can we be certain that the agency, or the court, is
respecting the wishes of Congress if the statutory text is silent or ambiguous?
Moreover, some critics of the Chevron model contend that there is little merit
to the argument that independent judicial interpretation of federal statutes
constitutes "usurpation" of an agency function. It is, after all, the province of
the judiciary to "say what the law is," and that is in fact what judges do when
they interpret all manner of non-regulatory federal statutes.
Despite these sometimes strident criticisms, Chevron has been a "pillar"
of administrative law since the Court decided it nearly twenty years ago.
Agencies, as well as Congress, have come to rely upon Chevron's interpretive
model, which, despite all of its faults, p:r:ovides some certainty that judicial
second-guessing will not constantly upset agency choices. Only where Congress plainly indicates a result contrary to that reached by the agency are courts
expressly authorized to intervene. Even its critics can agree that the Chevron
model "has the significant virtue of combining a fair degree of accuracy with
a reasonably clear rule. "292

289. See, e.g., Peter L. Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases Per Year: Some Implications
of the Supreme Court's Limited Resources for Judicial Review ofAgency Action, 87 COLUM.
L. REv. 1093, 1117-29 (1987) (noting that Chevron's presumption in favor of agency's
interpretation reduces friction between federal circuits and "enhances the probability of uniform
national administration of the laws").
290.
SUNSTEIN, supra note 17, at 42.
291. See, e.g., Merrill & Hickman, supra note 11, at 835 (exploring Chevron's scope); see
also Rossi, supra note 272, at 1116 ("For years ... the scope of Chevron's application has
puzzled courts.").
292.
Sunstein, supra note 11, at 2091.
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B. The Ascendance of the Independent Judgment Model
At the same time as it has been retreating from the deference afforded to
"appropriate" Section 5 enactments, the Court has been stepping back from
Chevron's strong deference to "reasonable" agency interpretations of law.
Chevron deference has recently been bifurcated. "Fonnal" agency interpretations that are expressly sanctioned in statutory text retain presumptive force
under Chevron, whereas more "infonnal" pronouncements are to be reviewed
under a highly contextual standard that focuses, ultimately, on the "persuasiveness" of the agency's interpretation. In contrast to the entrenched battles
that characterize recent Section 5 cases, here there is little disagreement in the
Court. Eight Justices- with Justice Scalia being the lone holdout- now appear
to be firmly convinced that Chevron cannot be applied as an ali-or-nothing
approach to judicial review of agency legal interpretations.293

1. Christensen: A Matter ofOpinion
Although there had certainly been signs of judicial ambivalence in years
past, 294 the retreat from the Chevron rule formally began in Christensen v.
Harris County. 295 In Christensen, the Court refused to give "full" Chevron
deference to an interpretation of the Fair Labor Standards Act issued to an
employer by the Acting Administrator ofthe Department of Labor's Wage and
Hour Division. The interpretation at issue was set forth in an agency "opinion
letter." Rejecting the Government's claim for deference to its construction of
the statute, the Supreme Court explained that opinion letters, like policy statements, agency manuals, and enforcement guidelines, lack the "force of law"
and are not entitled to full Chevron deference. 296
Rather, the Court said, informal interpretations are entitled to a degree of
deference only if they satisfy the factors set forth in Skidmore. 297 Skidmore
deference, which was in vogue well before Chevron came to be a "pillar" of
law, recognizes that even the least formal interpretation results from special

293. See infra text accompanying notes 304-26 (discussing eight-justice majority opinion
in Mead).
294. One commentator noted that "there
signs that Chevron is being transformed by the
Court into a new judicial mandate to 'say what the law is."' Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial
Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 YALE L.J. 969, 970 (1992).
295.
529
576 (2000).
296. See Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 586 (2000) (explaining that lack of
deference toward informal interpretations stems from lack of notice and comment that exists in
formal rulemaking).
297. See id. at 587 (citing Skidmore as requiring deference to informal interpretations
provided that they have "power'to persuade").

are

u.s.
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expertise and is entitled to some degree ofweight. 298 As Justice Jackson explained in Skidmore, some agency rulings, interpretations, and opinions
while not controlling upon the courts by reason of their authority, do constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to which courts and
litigants may properly resort for guidance. The weight of such a judgment
in a particular case will depend upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity ofits reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later
pronouncements, and all those factors which give it the power to persuade,
if lacking the power to control. 299

Thus, under Skidmore, the weight or deference afforded to informal agency
decisions or statements will ultimately depend upon how persuasive they are
to a court exercising independent judgment.
In Christensen, a nearly unanimous Court held that the agency's opinion
letter was not entitled to "full" Chevron deference. Christensen's full impact
on traditional Chevron deference was not entirely clear, however. 300 The
decision did not explain the rationale for refusing deference to less "formal"
agency interpretations. The Court appeared to have made a blanket determination that Congress did not intend "informal" interpretations to be binding on
courts or those regulated. 301 Moreover, the Court appeared to alter the focus
in Chevron's Step Two from whether the statute was silent and ambiguous, in
which case a reasonable agency interpretation would bind courts and litigants,
to whether there was some evidence in the statutory scheme that Congress
actually intended to delegate lawmaking authority to the agency. 302 Finally,
although there was general agreement that Chevron deference should not be
afforded the opinion letter in Christensen, the Justices differed on the proper
application of Skidmore deference, with various Justices emphasizing one
factor or another. 303
298. See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, I40 (I944) (noting that informal findings
of Labor Department Administrator were entitled to deference because they represented "a body
of experience and informed judgment" on which courts could depend) .
. 299. /d.
300. See Rossi, supra note 273, at IIIO-I2 (arguing that "the Christer.sen decision has
introduced even more confusion into the maze of cases regarding judicial review of agency
interpretations" and noting that "Christensen does not resolve every question regarding the
scope of Chevron deference").
301. /d. at 1122.
302. /d. at 1I46 (explaining that under Skidmore, congressional intent to give agency
lawmaking authority must be found before Chevron deference can apply).
303. Christensen, 529 U.S. at 599 (Scalia, J., dissenting); id. at 592 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 596 (Breyer, J., dissenting). For a list of questions that appeared to have been left
open after Christensen, see Merrill & Hickman, supra note II, at 849-52.
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2. Mead: The Counter-Chevron
Some, but not all, of the questions that the Supreme Court left open in
Christensen it answered in United States v. Mead Corp. 304 In Mead, the Court
continued its nearly-unanimous tilt away from Chevron's uniform deference
principle. 305 The narrow holding in Mead was that classification rulings issued
by the United States Customs Service pursuant to a federal statute were not
entitled to Chevron deference in determining the proper tariff classification of
imported goods. 306 Building on Christensen, eight Justices agreed that Chevron deference was not appropriate, "there being no indication that Congress
intended such a ruling to carry the force oflaw."307 With regard to congressional intent, the Court stated:
(A)dministrative implementation ofa particular statutory provision qualifies
for Chevron deference when it appears that Congress delegated authority to
the agency generally to make rules carrying the force of law, and that the
agency interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in the exercise
of that authority. 308

In sum, in place of Chevron's presumption, the Court placed upon the agency
the burden of demonstrating: first, that Congress delegated broad rulemaking
authority to the agency and, second, that the specific agency interpretation at
issue was an exercise ofthe delegated rulemaking authority. 309
In Mead, the Court described its precedents as producing "a spectrum of
judicial responses, from great respect at one end, to near indifference at the
other."310 The Court explained why Chevron deference was properly limited
to instances involving "express congressional authorizations to engage in the
process of rulernaking or adjudication that produces regulations or rulings for
304.
533 u.s. 218 (2001).
305. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218,221 (2001) (finding that administrative implementation of statute involving U.S. Customs Service did not qualifY for Chevron
deference because it did not appear that Congress intended to delegate such lawmaking
authority).
306. See id. at 224 (holding that classification rulings are beyond "pale" of Chevron). The
specific question was whether the Customs Service reasonably interpreted the statutory phrase
"diaries, notebooks and address books, bound" in Subheading 4820.10.20 of the Harmonized
Tariff Schedule of the United States to include the spiral-bound and ring-bound day planners
imported by respondent. /d.
307. ld. at221.
308. !d. at 226-27.
309. See id. (requiring clear congressional delegation of authority and requiring agency
interpretation to be pursuant to that authority).
310. /d. at 228 (citations omitted).
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which deference is claimed." 311 "It is fair to assume generally," the Court
explained, "that Congress contemplates administrative action with the effect
of law when it provides for a relatively fonnal administrative procedure tending to foster the fairness and deliberation that should underlie a pronouncement
of such force." 312 Although the Court emphasized formality, it quickly added
that the mere absence of a formal process does not necessarily preclude application of Chevron deference. 313 If indicia of congressional intent to delegate
interpretive power to the agency can be found elsewhere, the Court indicated,
perhaps Chevron deference would still apply.
The Court found "ample reasons" for denying Chevron deference to the
tariff ruling at issue in Mead. 314 The authorization of classification rulings, the
Court stated, "present[s] a case far removed not only from notice-and-comment
process, but from any other circumstances reasonably suggesting that Congress
ever thought of classification rulings as deserving the deference claimed for
them here. "315 Examining the statute and past agency practice, the Court found
no persuasive evidence of congressional intent to give classification rulings the
force oflaw. 316
Under the Court's new approach, however, finding Chevron deference
inapplicable did not end the matter. The Mead Court made explicit the bifurcated deference principle to which it had alluded in Christensen. The Court
announced that "Chevron did nothing to eliminate Skidmore's holding that an
agency's interpretation may merit some deference whatever its form, given the
'specialized experience and broader investigations and information' available
to the agency, and given the value of uniformity in its administrative and
judicial understandings of what a national law requires." 317 Whether that
deference was appropriate for the ruling at issue depended on the "merit of
[the] writer's thoroughness, logic and expertness, its fit with prior interpretations, and any other sources ofweight."318 The Court declined to undertake the
Skidmore inquiry in the first instance and remanded the matter to the court of
appeals. 319
311. ld. at 229. The Court noted that "the overwhelming number of our cases applying
Chevron deference have reviewed the fruits of notice-and-comment rulemaking or formal
adjudication." I d. at 230.
312. ld.
313. Id. at 230-31 (emphasis added).
314. Id. at23l.
315. Id.
316. Id. at 231-32.
317. Id. at 234 (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139 (1944)) (citations
omitted).
318. Id. at235.
319. ld. at238-39.
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For the majority, there was nothing inherently suspect about applying a
scaled version of the deference principle to the great variety of agency processes, forms, and enforcement schemes. 320 Its holding was premised upon a
choice, as the Court put it, between respect for the "breadth of the spectrum of
possible agency action" and a rule (Chevron) designed solely ''to limit and
simplify."321 Eight Justices chose scaled deference over simplification and
uniformity, placing their trust in lower court judges to make "reasoned choices
[between Chevron and Skidmore], . . . the way courts have always done. "322
Justice Scalia continued his lonely battle to retain a strong Chevron rule.
In a strongly worded dissent, he argued that Mead "marks an avulsive change
in judicial review of federal administrative action" and predicted that courts
and regulatees "will be sorting out the Mead doctrine, which has today replaced
the Chevron doctrine, for years to come."323 He further predicted that as a
result of the formalism inherent in the majority's opinion, we will see "an
artificially induced increase in informal rulemaking. "324 "Buy stock in the
GPO," he wrote, "[s]ince informal rulemaking and formal adjudication are the
only more-or-less safe harbors from the storm that the Court has unleashed. "325
And, finally, Justice Scalia dismissed the "sliding scale" of Skidmore deference, which is dependent upon a host of factors, as "an empty truism and a
trifling statement ofthe obvious: A judge should take into account the wellconsidered views of expert observers." 326

V. Conceptualizing Enforcement Legislation as
Constitutional Construction
It overstates the matter to view the Rehnquist Court's recent Section 5
jurisprudence principally as an interference with legislative factfinding. Conceptualizing the Section 5 cases in this manner ignores the unique constitutional dynamic of the congressional enforcement power. Section 5 reposes in
Congress the chief responsibility for administering the Fourteenth Amendment. 327 Congress carries out this administrative function by exercising a
320. See id. at 236 (noting that Court has traditionally tailored its deference to fit type of
administrative action involved).
321. /d.
322. /d. at237 n.18.
323. /d. at 239 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
324. /d. at 246 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
325. /d. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
326. /d. at 250 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
327. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,§ 5 ("The Congress shall have power to enforce, by
appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article."); see also Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S.
339, 346 (1879) ("[W]hatever tends ... to secure to all persons the enjoyment of perfect
equality of civil rights and the equal protection of the laws against State denial or invasion, if
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broad power to 11 enforce11 constitutional rights by any 11appropriate11 legislative
means. 328 Just as an agency administers governing law by interpreting it, so
must Congress render an interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment when
exercising its enforcement power. 329 This is a rather unusual interpretive
function for Congress. In the normal course, Congress impliedly renders an
interpretation of its own powers under, say, the Commerce Clause, simply by
enacting statutes. Those statutes necessarily affect rights, but they do not
interpret them in the same sense as enactments under Section 5. Put another
way, Commerce Clause enactments say something about Congress's view of
its own power (with which courts may or may not disagree), but unlike Section
5 enactments, which the Court has acknowledged may expand rights beyond
judicial precedent, they do not purport to construe the substance of rights
contained elsewhere in the Constitution.
A. Toward Judicial Supremacy: The Voting Rights Act of 1965 and the
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990

The Rehnquist Court has fundamentally altered the manner in which
Section 5 enactments are reviewed. The Court has moved from strong, Chevron-like deference toward Congress's constitutional interpretations to a model
of judicial supremacy. In this subpart, the Article examines two examples of
the application ofthe deference principle to congressional enforcement statutes
under the Civil War Amendments. The Voting Rights Act of 1965 and the
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 stand historically at polar ends of the
Court's Section 5 jurisprudence. The analysis will demonstrate that the
Rehnquist Court, while feigning some degree of deference to Congress's
Section 5 constructions, has firmly established the judicial supremacy model
under Section 5. Although it appears to leave itself open to persuasion, the
Court refuses to share the interpretive function with Congress under Section
5. Record review is part of the limiting equation the Court has adopted, but the
core of the matter is the Court's refusal to share interpretive power under
Section 5 with Congress.
1. The Voting Rights Act of 1965

The Voting Rights Act of 1965 11Was ·designed by Congress to banish the
blight of racial discrimination in voting, which has infected the electoral
process in parts of our country for nearly a century. 11330 In South Carolina v.
Katzenbach, the Supreme Court upheld various remedial provisions ofthe Act
as 11 appropriate11 measures against claims that they were beyond Congress's
not prohibited, is brought within the domain of congressional power.").
328. Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. at 345.
329. See Cole, supra note 15, at 59-60 (stating that Supreme Court and Congress have
concurrent responsibility to interpret constitutional provisions).
330. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301,308 (1966).
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power under Section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment. The "historical experience"331 ofthe country, and the Court's own specific encounters, with rampant
voting rights discrimination undoubtedly influenced the decision.
The Court noted that Congress, before it enacted the voting rights measures, had explored the problem with "great care. "332 Congress had also
rationally concluded that its past remedial measures had failed to put an end
to the "pervasive evil" of discrimination. 333 The Court itself was aware of the
lengths to which some states had gone to avoid these measures.334 Among the
avoidance practices the Court had encountered in past litigation were "grandfather" clauses, procedural hurdles, improper challenges, racial gerrymandering, and discriminatory application of voting rights tests. 335 In addition to
Congress's own findings, several courts had found a "pattern and practice" of
unconstitutional discrimination.336
In response to this apparent evil, Congress enacted a complex, but geographically limited, scheme of remedial and prophylactic measures. Among
other things, literacy tests and new voting regulations were to be suspended,
and federal examiners were to be enlisted by the Attorney General to determine who would be qualified to vote. For the Court, the "ground rules" for
detennining whether these measures were valid under Section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment were straightforward. 337 Congress needed only to demonstrate that it had used a "rational means" to prevent the evil of racial discrimination in voting. 338 The Court acknowledged that Congress was to be "chiefly
responsible" for implementing the rights guaranteed by Section 1 of the
Fifteenth Amendment and that the judiciary did not have the power to secondguess legislative enforcement choices. 339 The "basic test" was whether the
means chosen were "appropriate. "340
Under this reasonableness model of review, the Court had little difficulty
upholding the provisions ofthe Voting Rights Act. 341 The Court noted that the
provisions of the Voting Rights Act were consistent with similar exercises of
331. !d.
332. ld.
333. !d. at 309.
334. See id. at 310 (noting state adoption of various literacy tests to prevent AfricanAmerican citizens from voting).
335. !d. at 311-12.
336. Jd. at 312.
337. !d. at 324.
338. Jd.
339. See id. at 326 (outlining Congress's supremacy in implementing rights created in Section 1).
340. Jd.
341. See id. at 325-26 (concluding that Congress has full power to remedy racial discrimination in voting).
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congressional power in the past under the enforcement provisions. 342 Given
the complexity of the problem and the apparent entrenchment of states opposed to securing voting rights for every citizen, the Court concluded that
Congress had acted in "acceptable legislative fashion" using "relevant" evidence and "rational" means to effectuate the right to vote.343
Given the backdrop of historical evasion of Congress's efforts to secure
equal voting rights, the Court was willing to give Congress extra leeway in
construing the guarantees of the Fifteenth Amendment. This was so even
though certain provisions of the Voting Rights Act arguably extended the
bounds of the right to vote beyond the Court's prior precedents. South
Carolina argued that the suspension of literacy tests in particular was beyond
Congress's power, as the Court had previously held that literacy tests were not
per se unconstitutional. 344 Under the circumstances, however, the Court
concluded that the suspension of literacy tests, which had been used intentionally to deny the franchise to' Blacks, was a "legitimate response" to the problem and that Congress had "permissibly" rejected the alternative of requiring
a complete re-registration ofvoters. 345 Similarly, the Court upheld the provision suspending new voting regulations, reasoning that ''the Court has recognized that exceptional conditions can justifY legislative measures not otherwise appropriate. "346 Congress was indeed working in "unique circumstances"
in 1965.347
2. The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990

The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) was intended to
protect employees from workplace discrimination by employers, including the
states, based upon disability. 348 The ADA requires that under certain circumstances, employers must make "reasonable accommodations" to physical or
mental limitations of otherwise qualified individuals. 349 The ADA also prohibits employers from "utilizing standards, criteria, or methods of administration ... that have the effect of discrimination on the basis of disability." 350
342.
343.
344.
(1959).
345.
346.
347.
348.
349.
350.

/d. at 326 (citing enactments upheld by Court).
/d. at 328, 330.
/d. See generally Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45

South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301,334 (1966).
/d.
Jd at335.
42 U.S.C. § 1201(a}{b) (1994).
42 U.S.C. § 12112(bXSXA) (1994).
Id. § 12112(bX3XA).
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The basis for the ADA's waiver of state sovereign immunity was Section
5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. 351 By the time the Court addressed the ADA
in Garrett, it had already made clear that its review philosophy had changed
dramatically since the 1960s. The Court began its analysis of Congress's
Section 5 power as it always has- by recognizing that "Congress is not limited
to mere legislative repetition of this Court's constitutional jurisprudence."352
However, citing City ofBoerne, the Court noted that "it is the responsibility of
this Court, not Congress, to define the substance of constitutional guarantees."353 Congressional interpretations like the ADA that seek, in the Court's
view, to move beyond the Court's prior precedents must satisfy the "congruence and proportionality" standard.354
The Court then proceeded to the first step of its analysis - defining the
constitutional right at issue. The Court had never specifically decided whether
employment discrimination against the physically or mentally disabled violated
the Equal Protection Clause. But in Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center,
Inc., 355 the Court held more broadly that mental retardation was not a "quasisuspect" classification under the Equal Protection Clause. 356 Thus, for purposes of judicial review, classifications based on mental disability need only
satisfy the lenient "rational basis" test. 357 As the Garrett Court read Cleburne,
so long as the states had a rational reason to treat the mentally disabled differently from other classes of people, the Court's precedents did not expressly
condemn the states' choice. 358 Thus, states were not required to make accommodations for the disabled, "so long as their actions toward such individuals
are rational." 359 As the Court put it, "They could quite hardheadedly - and
perhaps hardheartedly - hold to job qualification requirements which do not
make allowance for the disabled." 360
Having already laid down the general contours of the constitutional right
at issue, the Court proceeded to its second inquiry- "whether Congress identified a history and pattern of unconstitutional employment discrimination by the
See id.. § 12101(bX4) (invoking Fourteenth Amendment as basis, in past, for ADA).
Bd. ofTrs. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356,365 (2001).
ld.
ld.
473 u.s. 432 (1985).
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 435 (1985).
See id. at 446 (concluding that ordinance requiring permit for operation of horne for
mentally retarded should receive only rational basis review).
358. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 367 (noting that states can act on basis of people's distinguishing
characteristics to treat people differently).
359. ld.
360. Id. at 367-68.
351.
352.
353.
354.
355.
356.
357.
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states against the disabled. "361 But the Court was not finished narrowing what
it believed to be the appropriate remedial inquiry under· Section 5. "Unconstitutional" in this context meant two things to the Court: first, that there had
been judicially recognizable irrational discrimination against the disabled and,
second, that the discrimination had been perpetrated by the state. 362 The first
limitation came from Cleburne. The second limitation, the "state action"
requirement, was in the Court's view implicit in Section 1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 363
Now the Court was finally prepared to examine Congress's legislative
record. Stare decisis had limited th~ predicate under consideration to a pattern
of discrimination by state actors that is constitutionally irrationa/. 364 This, of
course, was not the predicate that Congress had proceeded upon in enacting
the ADA. Thus, not surprisingly, the Court concluded that the legislative
record of the ADA "fail[ed] to show that Congress did in fact identify a pattern
of irrational state discrimination in employment against the disabled. "365
Neither Congress's broad findings that disability discrimination was a pervasive social problem nor its specific examples of discriminatory conduct by
state actors were deemed sufficient to satisfy the "congruence and proportionality" standard. 366 The former failed to adhere to the Court's narrow definition
of Fourteenth Amendment protections, and the latter incidents of discrimination .were rejected on the ground that the Court could not be certain that
Cleburne would condemn them as a constitutional matter. 367
Justice Breyer, in dissent, argued that Congress "reasonably could have
concluded that the remedy before us constitutes an 'appropriate' way to
enforce" the Equal Protection Clause. 368 He mistakenly, but understandably,
concluded that the Court's "primary problem with [the ADA] is one oflegislative evidence. "369 Justice Breyer even tried to meet the Court on what he
361. /d.
362. See id. at 368 (noting that Congress, in passing ADA. did not fmd irrational discrimination by states against disabled people).
363. See id. (noting that Fourteenth Amendment applies only to state action).
364. Defining the right at issue can often be dispositive. In Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S.
186 (1986), the Court defined the question presented as whether the Constitution "confers a
fundamental right upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy." Id. at 190. The formulation more
or less predetermined the Court's answer.
365. Bd. ofTrs. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 365,368 (2001).
366. See id. at 370-71 (dismissing Congress's record and accOunts as inadequate to prove
discrimination worthy of constitutional remedy).
367. /d. at 368-69.
368. /d. at 377 (Breyer, 1., dissenting).
369. /d. (Breyer, 1., dissenting).
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thought to be its own tenns by assembling an appendix which contained
evidence of discriminatory treatment by state governments. 370 The majority
criticized Appendix C to Justice Breyer's dissenting opinion, which it said
consisted of "unexamined, anecdotal accounts" of adverse and disparate treatment of the disabled. 371 The Court then emphasized that Justice Breyer had
misunderstood the "primary problem" with the ADA. 372 Disparate impact
alone, the Court emphasized, was not enough under its precedents to render
even state action "unconstitutional. "373
To bring the matter full circle, the Garrett Court compared the ADA
unfavorably with the Voting Rights Act of 1965, which the Court said had
been enacted with "great care" and after thorough consideration of the problem of discriminatory voting practices. 374 Unlike the "detailed but limited
remedial scheme" of the Voting Rights Act, the ADA struck the Court as little
more than a legislative judgment that there should be a uniform, national
mandate against disability discrimination. 375 Although the Court recognized
that "Congress is the final authority as to desirable public policy," it concluded that the ADA's waiver of state immunity was not based upon proper
considerations of judicially proscribed state discrimination. 376

B. Putting Record Review in Its Place
With this historical perspective on judicial review of enforcement enactments, we may at last put record review in its proper place. As noted, commentators have been critical of the Rehnquist Court's Section 5 jurisprudence
because it appears to invoke a heightened factual review in the context of
Congress's exercise of an express constitutional power. Some liken this to the
sort of "hard look" judicial review courts sometimes apply to formal agency
actions. 377 When a court takes a "hard look" at agency action, it examines the
agency's action on the basis of the whole record the agency has compiled in
support of its decision. The ultimate question is whether, based on the extant
record, the agency's action can be characterized as "arbitrary and capricious."
This does not mean that courts can substitute their own judgments for the
370. /d. at 389424 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
371. /d. at 370.
372. /d. at 372.
373. /d. at372-73.
374. !d. at373.
375. /d. at 374.
376. /d.
377. Cf Buzbee & Shapiro, supra note 4, at 119-35 (arguing that "legislative record"
review in Section 5 cases is more rigorous than "hard look" review of administrative action).
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agency's balancing of factors and policy choices. Rather, courts seek to
ascertain whether agencies have considered all relevant factors and have
engaged in sound, reasoned decisionmaking. 378 At the most basic level, the
approach cannot be extrapolated to Section 5, commentators say, because
Congress need not, and does not, compile the sort of legislative record that the
Court requires of agencies under "hard look" review. Congress's findings of
"fact," they say, must meet only ordinary empirical standards. 379
In addition to agency analogies, the Section 5 cases might also be characterized as applications of the heightened record review the Court has applied
to some "novel" and "implausible" regulations of free speech. 380 When the
Court engages in heightened review of the predicate for speech restrictions,
it examines the basis for Congress's determination that a "real" hann, like
cable signal bleed, exists. When the Court reviews enforcement legislation,
it examines whether a "real" harm exists such that remedial action is appropriate. Indeed, there are several parallels between heightened empiricism under
Section 5 and the First Amendment. Both apply to arguably "novel" exercises
of legislative power. 381 In both contexts, the Court declares a sphere of defer378. See, e.g., Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Fann Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29,
43 (1983) (underscoring that courts must consider whether agency action was based on
consideration of relevant factors).
379. This position raises a long-standing debate as to whether one can usefully distinguish
between matters of"fact" and issues of"law." See, e.g., Devins, supra note 12, at 1170 (arguing
that "the law-fact divide is a shibboleth, something that the Court invokes to justifY a conclusion
about whether it or Congress should settle an issue, not something with independent analytical
force"). For general discussions of the law/fact distinction, see Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional Fact Review, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 229 (1985), who argues that federal appellate courts
have a judicial duty to say what the law is but not to engage in constitutional fact review. See
also Samuel L. Pilchen, Politics v. The Cloister: Deciding When the Supreme Court Should
Defer to Congressional Factfinding Under the Post-Civil War Amendments, 59 NoTRE DAME
L. REv. 337 (1984) (suggesting that law/fact distinction should be scrapped to arrive at proper
scope of congressional power under post-Civil War amendments). It may not go too far to
suggest that simply "characterizing a matter as one of law or fact is no more than a conclusion,
based upon an evaluation of pertinent policies, that one branch of government rather than
another should make the decision in question." !d. at 396-97. This Article makes no effort to
defend fact/law or any other labeling conventions. "Congruence and proportionality" cannot
be described as an either/or standard. It is, like the Skidmore inquiry, a mixed bag of fact, law,
policy-making, and legal interpretation.
380. See supra notes 88-94 and accompanying text (explaining Court's approach to
regulation of speech cases).
381. As explained in Part In. although the enforcement powers under the Civil War
Amendments have been available to Congress for more than 1SO years, these powers have only
recently been invoked on a somewhat regular basis. This is so principally because the Court has
recently cast some doubt on the scope of the Commerce Clause and has limited Congress's
ability to waive state sovereign immunity. More specifically, it is one thing to exercise the
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ence to legislative power, only to scrutinize legislative predicates in an
arguably unprecedented fashion. 382 Finally, in both areas, the Court purports
to guard against legislative intrusions on the judicial power to define constitutional meaning by rigorously reviewing factual records.
Combining these analogies, we can characterize 11congruence and proportionality.. as a strain of 11hard look11 review by which the Court tests the
11
plausibility11 of Section 5 enactments, judged, always, against the backdrop
of judicial precedents. Whether the chosen analogy is 11hard 1ook11 or heightened empiricism under the First Amendment, however, there is a fundamental
difference between these empirical approaches and the Rehnquist Court's
analysis of Section 5 legislation. The difference is rooted in the interpretive
function Congress undertakes under Section 5 and the Court's judicial supremacy model for review of Section 5 enactments.
The primary Section 5 goalpost that the Court has shifted since the 1960s
has been interpretive, not factual. What has changed since the 1960s and 70s
is the Court's method of review of legislative interpretations of constitutional
rights. What has caused Congress fits, and what threatens to scuttle a host of
future Section 5 enactments, is not the legislature's inability to compile impressive records ofits factual findings, but rather the Court's broad proscription of
legislative constructions that do not comport with judicial stare decisis. 383
Because of this judicial philosophy, what a court ends up examining under
Section 5 is not Congress 's empirical predicate (for which there has often been
voluminous support), but instead a narrowjudicial predicate that inmost, ifnot
all, cases will fall beyond Congress's institutional capacity to demonstrate. 384
Congress has assumed, incorrectly, that Section 5 contains a measure of
enforcement power to remedy or prevent racial discrimination, as in the Voting Rights Act of
1965, and quite another to invoke it to redress purported injuries to private property rights under
the patent laws, as Congress purported to do in 1992. See supra Part ill (discussing Congress's
forced resourcefulness as result of its diminished commerce power).
382. There are good reasons for being wary of the Court's approach to "novel" enactments
under the First Amendment. Heightened record review is a very indeterminate exercise of judicial power, as the discussion of the First Amendment area demonstrates. Still, one can conceive
of a defense for greater scrutiny of legislative predicates when free speech is affected. Carolene
Products itself indicates that more careful scrutiny is warranted when fundamental rights are
involved, and the Court has always purported to exercise its independent review powers, even
of factual matters, in First Amendment cases. These arguments cannot be extrapolated to Congress's express powers, however, which have long been upheld based upon a presumption that
Congress had a factual predicate for the exercise of such powers.
383. See infra Part V.C.l (explaining Rehnquist Court's strict analysis of Congress's Section 5 enactments).
384. Colker and Brudney refer to the Court's changing empirical requirements as "crystal
ball" and "phantom legislation" approaches. Colker & Brudney, supra note 4, at 85.

900

59 WASH & LEE L. REV. 839 (2002)

interpretive flexibility and that a legislative construction of sufficient persuasiveness might satisfy the Court. The primary focus of commentators' criticism - that the Court is second-guessing Congress's factual predicates - is
somewhat off target. This is not to say that the Court's recent empirical
approach is not wanting, but simply that it is not the principal cause oflegislative distress under Section 5.
It would overstate matters to contend that the Court need not concern
itself with factual matters at all under Section 5. Even under the very deferential reasonableness standard the Court applied in the 1960s, Congress did not
receive an empirical pass. It just so happened that the record associated with
the Voting Rights Act of 1965 was substantial and, thus, able to support
several early Section 5 enactments. 385 South Carolina v. Katzenbach demonstrates that a record may be quite convincing when coupled with the common
sense of the era. Still, the early cases did not necessarily establish a high
empirical threshold under the enforcement provisions. Although we cannot
know for certain, it may have scarcely been necessary in 1965, given the
history that preceded the Voting Rights Act and the general legislative and
judicial awareness of the evil itself, to demonstrate empirically what everyone
knew tO be the case. 386
The radical departure. that has set Section 5 on its current path is doctrinal, not factual. If the question were whether Congress had a sufficient
legislative record to demonstrate the existence of its chosen predicate - gender
385. See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 308-09 (1966) (discussing "great
care" and thoroughness Congress had demonstrated in exploring problem of racial discrimination in voting practices).
386. The Court has a checkered history with de novo review of factual predicates. Under
the "constitutional facts doctrine." the Court engaged in rigorous review of agency action when
the plaintiff alleged that the action violated some provision of the Constitution, as opposed to
a federal statute or regulation, or when the fact at issue was determinative of Congress's power
to enact the legislation at issue given the constitutional limitations on its power. See Crowell
v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 60-61 (1932) (stating that courts must independently determine whether
injury occurred on navigable waters of United States when agency's jurisdictional power to
award compensation is dependent on that fact); Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284-85
(1922) (stating that courts must independently determine citizenship of person ordered to be
deported when constitutional power to deport depends on citizenship); see also John Dickinson,
Crowell v. Benson: Judicial Review ofAdministrative Determinations ofQuestions of"Constitutional Fact," 80 U. PA. L. REv. 1055, 1061-63 (1932) (predicting that de novo review of
"constitutional facts" in administrative proceedings would prove disruptive and unworkable).
Professor Monaghan has noted that the constitutional facts doctrine had its origins in the
"doctrine of jurisdictional fact" applied by the King's Bench. Henry P. Monaghan. Constitutional Fact Review, 85 CoLUM. L. REv. 229, 249 (1985). The approach was quickly abandoned
by the Court, in large part based upon the recognition that judicial involvement on such a large
scale would inhibit administrative flexibility. DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 271, § 178.
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or disability discrimination in the case ofVAWA and the ADA, respectively,
for example - then there is every reason to believe that many of the recently
invalidated Section 5 enactments would have survived scrutiny. A close
reading of the Section 5 cases indicates that the Court is not principally
concerned that Congress has been remiss in compiling records.
In City ofBoerne, the Court said that it would not have upheld the RFRA
even if Congress had bothered to compile a record in support of the statute,
rather than directly challenging the Court's constitutional precedent. 387 The
Court struck down the VAWA provisions in Morrison despite overwhelming
evidence of gender bias in the state criminal justice systems. 388 The substantial evidence in Garrett, compiled over the course of several years, that disability discrimination was a serious and prevalent societal problem, likewise
failed to sustain the ADA. 389 The Court could ignore all of this evidence only
by refusing to give any deference at all to Congress's construction of the
Equal Protection Clause. Record review, properly characterized, is not a
means of examining legislative predicates at all, but rather a tool the Court
utilizes only after the outcome has been preordained by the application of
judicial stare decisis to legislative interpretations of the Constitution.

C. Enforcement, Construction, and Judicial Review
Section 5 contemplates that Congress will be the primary enforcer of the
guarantees set forth in Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment. 390 The Court
seems to acknowledge that in the course of enforcing the Constitution, Congress will sometimes construe or interpret the Constitution differently than the
judiciary. Unfortunately, that bare recognition is as far as the Rehnquist Court
has been willing to venture so far. At the moment, the Court lacks a principled method by which to review Congress's constitutional constructions under
Section 5. In this Section, the Article analogizes the Court's analysis under
Section 5 to its method ofreview of agency constructions under Chevron. In
the next Section, the Article proposes that the Court follow the path it has
charted in Mead when reviewing Section 5 legislation, opening itself to
387. See City of Boerne v. Flores 521 U.S. 507, 531 (1997) (noting that Congress's lack
of record in passing RFRA was not Act's most serious flaw).
388. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598,619-20 (2000) (noting that Government
pointed to "voluminous congressional record" of "pervasive bias" against women in various
state justice systems).
389. See supra text accompanying notes 250-53 (explaining Congress's finding of historical discrimination against disabled persons).
390. See supra notes 327-29 and accompanying text (explaining Congress's responsibility
for administering Fourteenth Amendment).

902

59 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 839 (2002)

deference where the legislature's construction of the Constitution is "persuasive."
1. The Section 5 Two-Step

This Article has already mentioned some of the historical similarities
between the Court's review of agency constructions and its examination of
Congress's early enforcement enactments. The path of the deference principle
has been similar with respect to both types of constructions. Until its last few
tenns, the Court seemed to have accepted that "reasonable" constructions of
governing law by the other branches are deserving of deference. 391 The winds
of distrust - of Congress in both instances - have caused a substantial turnabout, with the Relmquist Court now unwilling to afford strong deference to
many agency constructions, while refusing deference to all legislative constructions under Section 5. 392 The dilemma with respect to each type of construction is the same: ·how to balance judicial deference to the interpretations
ofmore expert and accountable institutions without abdicating the judicial duty
under Marbury to "say what the law is." The Court has instructed lower courts
to review agency interpretations under Skidmore for their persuasive effect,
while examining Congress's interpretations under Section 5 for their "congruence and proportionality" in light of the Court's precedents. 393
In structural terms, the Court's approaches to judicial review of agency
and congressional interpretations are quite similar. The Court undertakes a
two-step inquiry with respect to each form of interpretation. Under Section 5,
at what might be called Step One, the Court seeks to identify the scope of the
constitutional right at issue. This is roughly analogous to Chevron's Step One
inquiry, where courts are directed to determine whether Congress has spoken
in the governing statute to the precise issue under consideration. Under Section 5, of course, the framers and ratifiers would be the logical first focus of
inquiry; the courts would seek to determine whether the text, or perhaps
history, speaks to the precise issue in question.
The Constitution rarely, if ever, speaks precisely to an issue under consideration, and its ambiguity is perhaps nowhere more evident than in the
Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of "equal protection." Those who drafted
and ratified the Fourteenth Amendment did not address specific interpretive
issues relating to the equality right, for example, but rather left these matters
391. See supra Part IV.A (analyzing Chevron decision and its staying power).
392. See supra Part IV.B and Part V.A.
393. Although neither approach is without fault, only the Skidmore approach allows for
shared constructive power.
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to be fleshed out by Congress and the courts. Thus, it is appropriate that
under Section 5, at Step One, the Court look to its own precedents to define
the scope of the right to be protected. If the judiciary is to remain supreme in

declaring the meaning of law, as Marbury suggests, then courts should not
interpret Section 5 to countenance enactments whose sole purpose is to codify
a reading of the Constitution that differs from the Court's own specific
interpretation. This would be analogous to an agency interpretation that
contradicts the plain language of a statute. As the Court stated in City of
Boerne: When Congress legislates "against the background of a judicial
interpretation o( the Constitution already issued, it must be understood that in
later cases and controversies the Court will treat its precedents with the
respect due them under settled principles, including stare decisis. "394 The
problem, as we shall see, is that the Court takes a rather broad view of stare
decisis under Section 5.
At Step Two, the Section 5 inquiry, like the Chevron inquiry, considers
whether, in the absence of a definitive pronouncement on the meaning of the
text with respect to a precise issue, there is reason to defer to the proposed
construction. Under Section 5, of course, that construction emanates from
Congress. The Court has applied the "congruence and proportionality"
standard to all Section 5 enactments, whereas the deference principle under
Chevron has been bifurcated, with fonnal interpretations rendered pursuant
to express delegations afforded strong deference, and with infonnal interpretations - where delegation is less clear - provided a weaker form of deference
under Skidmore. The "congruence and proportionality" standard applies even
though the Constitution plainly delegates an interpretive power to Congress.
The congruence standard, like the Chevron, Mead, and Skidmore standards,
is intended to measure the degree of deference, if any, the Court will afford
to a construction of governing law.
The only decision in which the Court treated the Step One inquiry as dispositive thus far was City ofBoerne, the first precedent to announce the "congruence and proportionality" standard. It is the rare case in which Congress
so blatantly disrespects clear judicial precedent. 395 If that occurs, however,
then the Court may feel that it has no choice but to assert its power to "say
what the law is." Ifthe Court has rendered a decision on the precise issue that
Congress has addressed in Section 5 legislation, then there can be only one
supreme interpretation. So long as Marbury remains the law of the land, the
394.
395.

City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 501,536 (1997).

But see, e.g., Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 443 (2000) (holding that
Miranda's warning-based approach to interrogation of accused was constitutionally based and
could not be overruled by act of Congress).
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power to render supreme interpretations must necessarily belong to the Court
under Section 5.
As it has for agency interpretations, the difficulty arises when the text is
ambiguous or silent, or when the Court has not spoken to the precise issue at
hand. Inherent ambiguities in constitutional provisions pose some of the same
fundamental separation of powers issues as ambiguities and gaps left in federal
statutes. Who is to decide meaning where the Constitution leaves gaps? By
what standard?
Congress, of course, does not labor under the same institutional limitations that restrict the judiciary's ability and willingness to interpret constitutional rights. 396 Just as agencies are to be the primary enforcers of ambiguous
or silent statutes, Section 5 contemplates that Congress is to be the chief enforcer of the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Constitution
contemplates a measure of "gap filling" by Congress, and anticipates a degree
of constructive deference from the judiciary.397 As the Court seems to acknowledge, the power to enforce and administer the Fourteenth Amendment
granted to Congress under Section 5 contemplates that Congress may extend
rights beyond the confines of Supreme Court precedent. The Court has in fact
afforded judicial deference to Congress's extra-judicial constructions on several occasions in the past - in South Carolina v. Katzenbach and Katzenbach
v. Morgan, for example. These and other cases stand for, among other things,
the proposition that even if the Court interprets the Constitution to prohibit
only purposefUl discrimination, Congress has the power under the enforcement
provisions of the Civil War Amendments to expand the constitutional guarantee of equality to prohibit acts that have a disparate impact on certain disadvantaged classes.
During the heyday of judicial deference in the 1960s, Section 5 and the
other enforcement powers conceptually stretched as far as the Necessary and
Proper Clause would take them. Just as agency interpretations under Chevron's Step Two inquiry needed only to be reasonable, so too did congressional
action need only a rational explanation for its enactments under the Civil War
Amendments to be deemed "appropriate. "398 But just as the Rehnquist Court
396. See Michael W. McConnell, Institutions and Interpretation: A Critique of City of
Boerne v. Flores, 111 HARv. L. REv. 153, 155 (1997) (noting that courts are ill-suited to make
economic judgments); Post & Siegel, supra note 158, at 467-73 (noting Court's self-acknowledged institutional limitations); see also Cole, supra note 15, at 65-66 (noting similarities in
institutional considerations under Chevron and Section 5 and suggesting that Court reject only
legislative interpretations that are "predicated on an unreasonable interpretation of the substantive constitutional liberty enforced").
397. See Post & Siegel, supra note 158, at 467 (noting that judicial restraint often prevents
courts from intruding on legislative discretion).
398. In Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966), the Court stated, with respect to
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has diminished the domain of Chevron, it has, by only the slightest majority,
dramatically altered the Step Two inquiry under Section 5. It is no longer the
case that the Section 5 power, even as a conceptual matter, parallels the
Necessary and Proper Clause. No longer must legislative constructions under
Section 5 only be reasonable to receive strong judicial deference. Indeed,
after Garrett, it is difficult to discern any degree of deference to congressional
efforts to fill enforcement gaps that exist under the Fourteenth Amendment. 399
By collapsing everything into the Step One inquiry, where stare decisis reigns
supreme, the Rehnquist Court has treated legislative constructions as wholly
subject to the grace of the judiciary's independent judgment.
2. Models for Sharing Constructive Power Under Section 5

As it began to reconsider the Section 5 power in 1997, the Court could
have chosen any one of three models for judicial review of legislative constructions at Step Two of the Section 5 inquiry. 400 It could have, as it did in
the 1960s and 1970s, deferred to any reasonable or rational legislative construction. Instead, it might have chosen to exercise a greater degree of independent judgment, and uphold only those constructions that meet some higher
standard, say of persuasiveness. The third option, and the one the Court
actually chose to apply, was the judicial supremacy model, under which the
Court refuses deference to any legislative constructions that do not satisfy an
aggressive version of judicial stare decisis.
Although it invokes Section 5's history, the Court has essentially abandoned all pretense of following the respectful approach of South Carolina v.
Katzenbach and Katzenbach v. Morgan regarding the scope of the enforcement powers under the Civil War Amendments. It is one thing to acknowledge the spirit of those decisions, as the Court routinely has in recent Section
5 cases. It is quite another to translate the deference those precedents respected into current practice. For at least five members of the Rehnquist
Court, that is a level of deference that chafes too strongly against Marbury's
core. Heightened record review under Section 5 is a manifestation of the
Court's discomfort with a regime of shared constructive power.
Congress's exercise of its power under Section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment: "It is not for us
to review the congressional resolution of these factors. It is enough that we be able to perceive
a basis upon which the Congress might resolve the conflict as it did." /d. at 653.
399. See Post & Siegel, supra note 158, at 467-68 (noting possibility of"enforcement gap"
under Fourteenth Amendment).
400. For a discussion along similar lines, see McConnell, supra note 396, at 173. I do not
even consider the possibility that Congress might exercise plenary power under Section 5. One
thing the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment did make clear was that Congress's power was
not intended to be plenary. See id. at 174-76 (discussing intentions of framers of Fourteenth
Amendment).
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There may be good reasons for refusing to apply the strong deference of
the 1960s to Congress's more recent Section 5 enactments. Again, a useful
parallel might be drawn between the Court's Section 5 model and the Court's
recent decision to refuse strong deference to most agency interpretations,
applying instead the Skidmore model. First, there is the question of textual
authority to bind the courts to Congress's interpretations. Although Congress
undoubtedly exercises an interpretive function under Section 5, there is little,
if any, support for the notion that Congress's constructions were intended to
carry the "force of law." The delegated power simply was not so broad, although judicial review of Section 5 and other enforcement enactments during
the "exceptional circumstances" ofthe 1960s came very close indeed to accepting legislative constructions as the law of the land.
Given the historical and political context, it is not at all surprising that the
Court gave Congress such wide latitude in the early years. As it has in Mead,
the Rehnquist Court has now taken a second look at the scope of deference
owed to other interpreters. With respect to agencies, the Court does not trust
Congress to delegate carefully to agencies or to oversee their work, which has
spilled into ever more novel areas. 401 With respect to Congress, the Court does
not trust the legislature to refrain from burdening the states unnecessarily
through its own interpretation of the substantive meaning of the Constitution.
Second, again as in Mead, "informal" constructions generally merit less
weight than those that are promulgated through formal processes. 402 It may
seem odd to characterize the legislative process as informal. We envision as
part of that process formal statements for the record, witnesses, hearings,
investigations, and even the provision of some constitutional protections.
However, as commentators and scholars have noted, the legislative· process
shares many of the characteristics of informal agency processes. 403 Many
commentators critical of the Court's approach under Section 5 have noted, in
particular, that Congress is not required to compile a formal record of its
proceedings and in a great many instances does not do so. 404 Moreover, Congress relies to a large extent on informal contacts, institutional experience, and
401. Changes in telecommunications, health care, and the environment, to name only a
few, have launched agencies into more and more complex policymaking.
402. See supra notes 298-313 and accompanying text (discussing formal and informal
agency rulemaking).
403. See, e.g., Bryant & Simeone, supra note 4, at 383-89 (noting Congress's historical
dependence on information not found in record to reach its legislative judgments); see also
Devins, supra note 12, at 1182-87 (noting that information from informal sources can find its
way into legislative records).
404. See Buzbee & Shapiro, supra note 4, at 94-95 (noting that Congress is not required
by Constitution to preserve legislative process on record).
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range of other infonnal processes in making its policy choices. 405 Similarly,
when an agency engages in less fonnal proceedings, like notice-and-comment
rulemaking, it is not required under the APA to produce a fonnal record of its
proceedings or to provide a detailed explanation of its decision. 406 Nevertheless, an agency's decision or interpretation may stand a better chance of
surviving judicial review if voluminous documents and detailed factual findings are presented to the court. In these infonnal settings, courts seek to ensure
that careful, deliberative, and logical decisionmaking has taken place.
Finally, on a more general level, there may be merit to the Court's concern
that granting so much leeway to Congress under Section 5 diminishes or
undennines Marbury's core principle. Recall that the same argument has been
made against Chevron from the beginning, 400 Many years of experience, along
with an increasingly complex regulatory environment, caused the Court to
reconsider Chevron's premises. Similarly, the Court has both precipitated and
witnessed an expansive use ofthe Section 5 power. As we have seen, the Court
is particularly protective of its interpretive function when it reviews exercises
of legislative power it deems to be "novel. "408 The Voting Rights Act of 1965,
which spawned the bulk of the Court's pronouncements concerning the scope
of the enforcement powers under the Civil War Amendments, did not strike the
Court as a novel exercise of power. Indeed, the Court was keenly aware ofthe
significant problem of voting discrimination; it had itself presided over disputes demonstrating the strength of Southern resolve to thwart the will of
Congress in enforcing the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. 409 The
Patent Remedy Act of 1992 does not stand on the same historical footing. And
while the VAWA and the ADA raise substantial concerns of discriminatory
treatment based on gender and disability, those statutes suffered from bad
timing - they reached the Court after Congress had poisoned the well with the
RFRA.
There may be cause to reexamine the scope ofthe Section 5 power in light
of these concerns. But upon reexamining the Chevron doctrine in Mead, the
Court did not simply switch from strong deference to no deference at all. The
Mead doctrine or model is a far more nuanced approach to judicial review of
constructionS than is the judicial supremacy model the Court has chosen under
Section 5. In the next Part, this Article urges the Court to apply a similarly
flexible approach to Congress's interpretations under Section 5.
405.
406.
J. 38,61
407.
408.
409.

See Pilchen, supra note 379, at 362-69 (describing legislative process offact-fmding).
See William F. Pedersen, Jr., Formal Records and Informal Rulemaldng, 85 YALE L.
(1975) (noting that agencies must deal with unwieldy records).
See Sunstein, supra note 11, at 2074-75 (describing Chevron as counter-Marbury).
Supra Part II.B.
Supra notes 334-36 and accompanying text.
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VI. Respecting Deference, Reviving Dialogue: The Enforcement of

Constitutional Text
The path of judicial supremacy the Court has chosen under Section 5 is
not inevitable. Nor is it necessarily permanent~ "congruence and proportionality" as applied in recent cases commands a narrow five~to-four majority on the
Court, and there may well be new appointments to the Court in the near term.
In the meantime, as Mead teaches, the Court is not stuck with only two
choices -judicial supremacy or the near-abdication of judicial review. This
Article proposes that it is possible under Section 5 to respect simultaneously
a sphere of legislative deference and Marbury's essence. Indeed, the Court
demonstrated as much in Mead.
Chevron's shrinking domain suggests that rigid review of interpretations
using uniform deference rules is often an unsatisfactory solution to separation
of powers concerns that arise when the branches share interpretive power.
Rather than holding Congress to a questionable version ofjudicial stare decisis
under Section 5, the Court might choose instead to respect Congress's con~
structions under a different model of review, one that allows greater judicial
probing of the facets of interpretation that seem to matter most - the interpreter's thoroughness, consistency, logic, and care. 410 Naturally, as part ofthat
review, the Court might examine the record submitted in support of Congress's
factual predicate. 411 The fundamental difference proposed here is that the
predicate examined would belong to Congress, not the Court.
"Congruence and proportionality" should be applied in a manner that
gives Congress an opportunity to cOnvince the Court of the "persuasiveness"
of its construction. In order for something like Skidmore deference to be
applied to Congress's constructions under Section 5, however, the first thing
that must occur is a change in judicial attitude toward the sharing of power
under the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court refuses to share power because
it is convinced that judicial supremacy is somehow required by the Constitution. Another large concern, which arises in cases like Garrett, is that Congress will interfere with traditional state functions by incongruously waiving
410. Although it is early, courts that have applied the Mead/Skidmore model appear to
appreciate its flexibility. See, e.g., Student Loan Fund ofldaho, Inc. v. U.S. Dep't ofEduc., 272
F.3d 1155, 1164 (9th Cir. 2001) (recognizing that fair amount of deference was due under Mead
to agency's interpretation); Kaspar Wire Works, Inc. v. Sec'y of Labor, 268 F.3d 1123, 1131
(D.C. Cir. 2001) (noting that Secretary's interpretation is entitled to deference "given her
official duty, specialized expertise, investigatory knowledge, and other experience relevant to
carrying out the purposes of the Act"). But see U.S. Freightways Corp. v. Comm'r, 270 F.3d
1137, 1141 (7th Cir. 2001) (refusing deference to Commissioner's interpretation of deduction
that court found unpersuasive).
411. See supra notes 385-89 and accompanying text (explaining importance of legislative
record when passing Section 5 legislation).
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state immunity. Whatever ambiguities persist in the framing and ratification
of Section 5, two things are clear: first, that Congress, not the Court, was to be
chiefly responsible for administering the Fourteenth Amendment and, second,
that Section 5 was specifically intended to burden the states to a degree by
expanding Congress's power to enforce the Constitution. 412 Accordingly,
insofar as the Court refuses to share the constructive function and bases that
refusal on its own notions of federalism, it is doubly wrong. Marbury does not
entitle the Court to prohibit legislative constructions under Section 5 by
stretching stare decisis any more than it entitles courts to invalidate agency
constructions solely on the ground that the courts would have rendered a different construction had the matter been presented to the courts in the first instance.
The Rehnquist Court's invocation of stare decisis as the defining principle for Section 5 enactments is fundamentally at odds with the Court's own
recertt judicial philosophy. Even when it does decide constitutional cases, the
Court tends not to decide very much. The Court practices a brand of "judicial
minimalism" by which it favors narrow decisions over broad doctrinal pronouncements.413 There are many sound reasons for exercising this sort of
judicial conservatism. As a matter of constitutional power, the Court may
only decide the case before it. The Court also adjudicates issues under certain
institutional limitations. Courts are not well equipped to discern or predict
broad social trends or to find facts relating to them. Thus, constructs like
"rational basis" represent a judicial admission of sorts that the third, and "least
dangerous," 414 branch is not equipped as an institution to replace or supersede
complex democratic processes. These same basic structural and democratic
considerations led the Court to defer, under Chevron, to the reasonable interpretations and "policy" choices of executive agencies. 415
The effect of this minimalism, however, is that the Rehnquist Court
leaves many questions unanswered. Thus, the Court generally reads its own
precedents narrowly, not as dispositive of a broad swath of issues. The
approach is attractive to the Court in part ·because it minimizes judicial
errors. 416 Judicial minimalism is also democratically attractive because by not
412. See Thomas W. Beimers, Searching for the Structural Vision ofCity of Boerne v.
Flores: Vertical and Horizontal Tensions in the New Constitutional Architecture, 26 HAsTINGs
CONST. L.Q. 789, 795 (1999) (explaining purpose of Civil War Amendments); .see Ex parte
Virginia, 100 U.S. 339,345 (1879) ("It is the power of Congress which has been enlarged.").
413. See supra note 17 and accompanying text (stating that Court prefers to settle as little
as possible in constitutional cases).
414. Al.EXANDERBICKEL, THELEASTDANGEROUSBRANCH(2ded.1986).
415. Supra notes 276-79 and accompanying text.
416. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 17, at 4 (noting reduction of risk Court takes when it refuses
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foreclosing future arguments, it leaves open channels for future dialogue and
debate. 411
Unfortunately, the Court has followed precisely the opposite approach
under Section 5, in which, with respect to Congress, it treats merely relevant
judicial precedents as settling the matter of constitutional substance for all
time. A decision that classifications based upon mental retardation do not
require heightened judicial scrutiny does not settle whether classifications
based on, for example, physical impairment should be. This is a gap in enforcement that Congress has the power to fill.
Gaps in existing constitutional doctrine, and the institutional limitations
under which courts must labor, leave much room for executive and legislative
interpretation of governing law. As agency constructions and other enforcement actions are interpretations of statutory text, so too are Congress's enactments under Section 5 constructions of constitutional text. These constructions are made in furtherance of official legislative duties and are based on
more specialized experience and broader investigations and information than
is likely to come to the attention of the courts. They no more change the
substance of constitutional text than an agency's interpretation with which the
Court happens to disagree changes the text of the federal statute being administered. Furthermore, if the states, or their people, do not agree with the
legislative construction of rights under Section 5, the democratic process,
imperfect as it is, exists to correct mistakes and congressional overreaching.
With a basic change in judicial perspective, application of a Skidmoretype deference to Congress's constitutional constructions under Section 5
would not represent a radical proposition. In some sense, reviewing the logic,
care, and thoroughness of Congress's enactments under the Civil War Amendments is what the Court has been doing all along. This is not simply a matter
of parsing legislative record$. Although the Court noted the great care with
which Congress had acted in compiling a record of voting discrimination, 418
validation of the Voting Rights Act was not simply about the volume of the
record. It was the logic and consistency of Congress's position that the Court
found inescapable. Congress's purpose- to rid the country of the evil of
racial discrimination in voting- was clear. Its enactment was consistent with
prior uses of the enforcement power under provisions of the Civil Rights
Amendments. 419 Faced with Southern intransigence in the form of poll taxes
to speak broadly on complex issues).

417. ld.
41 8. See sup1'a note 334 and accompanying text (noting care with which Congress had
explored racial discrimination in voting).
419. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301,326 (1966).
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and numerous other voting restrictions, Congress acted decisively in what the
Court deemed an 11inventive11 manner. 420 Eschewing case-by-case litigation,
for example, as an ineffective weapon, Congress instead prescribed remedies
that did not require prior adjudication. Congress also limited the scope of the
remedial provisions to specific geographic areas and used relevant tests and
devices to determine where the remedial focus should lie. 421 All of this, not
simply the state of the legislative record, demonstrated that the Voting Rights
Act was an appropriate response to a defined evil.
Application of a Skidmore-type deference principle under Section 5
carries the same primary risk that it does when applied to agency interpretations -the difficulty for the interpreter to know, in advance, whether an enactment will meet the Court's notion of persuasiveness. But under a Skidmore
model, at least Congress's construction will be considered on the merits, rather
than decided in all cases at Step One, based upon a rigid application of strict
rules of stare decisis. Neither an executive agency nor Congress has the right
to insist on a rule of decision that guarantees deference for any and every
interpretation. Particularly when we are talking about interpreting the Constitution, there is good cause to examine carefully the reasons advanced for an
expansion of substantive rights. So long as the model of review does not stack
the deck against all interpretations rendered by Congress, Marbury pennits the
judiciary to call upon Congress to justify its constructions.
In some cases, it may well be that Congress will fail to persuade the
Court, based on the thoroughness of its work, the logic of its construction, and
the consistency of its enactment with other exercises of Section 5 power, that
an interpretation is entitled to deference. The Patent Remedy Act of 1992 is
a good example of an enactment that, at least based upon the record assembled
and the reasons advanced, was a very close case. 422 Florida Prepaid, in which
the Court invalidated the Act, demonstrates how the Court might apply a Skidmore model under Section 5.
The Patent Remedy Act was a rather unique exercise of Congress's Section 5 power. Congress had never before used the Section 5 authority to enact
remedial legislation aimed solely at property rights. Thus, the Court may have
viewed the Patent Remedy Act as a 11novel 11 exercise of the Section 5 power.
Congress identified the transgressing conduct as the possibility that states
would or might interfere with private patent rights, specifically by interfering
with those rights and then invoking sovereign immunity to insulate themselves
420. !d. at 327.
421. /d. at 328-30.
422. See supra note 214 and accompanying text (discussing dissent's finding of substantial
record in Patent Remedy Act).
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from suit. To be sure, the Florida Prepaid Court found little evidence to
support the claim that this evil actually existed - it was, after all, a legislative
prediction of hann. 423 But the Court also took aim at the logic of Congress's
construction of the Due Process Clause as well. Mere interference with property rights does not offend the Due Process Clause. Rather, the clause focuses
on inadequate process or remedy. How could the states be violating the Due
Process Clause if they were, in fact, providing remedies to injured patent
owners for infringements? For all that appeared, states were not cloaking
themselves in sovereign immunity or otherwise denying remedies for infringements. Or at least Congress had not presented a strong case that states were
misbehaving in that manner. In the Court's view, Congress barely paused to
consider the matter of state remedies at all. 424
The Court went on in Florida Prepaid to criticize Congress for failing to
limit its inquiry to intentional or reckless infringements. 425 The Court itself has
interpreted the Due Process Clause to proscribe only intentional deprivation of
rights, although it has never done so in the context of patent rights. 426 Congress, by contrast, has permitted recovery under federal law even when the
infringement is inadvertent or negligent. 427 Because the Supreme Court did not
have a precedent on the precise issue in question, there was room under Step
Two of its analysis for some measure of deference. One interpretation of the
decision is that the Court was not persuaded, based on the record before it and
the history of the Due Process Clause, that there was a "plausible argument"
that the Due Process Clause called for a uniform national remedy for state
patent infringements. 428 That purpose, the Court said, was not persuasive under
Section 5, although it was a valid consideration under Article 1. 429
In rejecting Congress's interpretation of the Due Process Clause, the
Florida Prepaid Court emphasized that the "lack of support in the legislative
record is not determinative." 430 The absence of factual support was, of course,
determinative in the sense that Congress had not presented evidence to support
423. See supra text accompanying notes 209-13 (discussing Court's conclusion that Congress had failed to identifY more than "speculative harm").
424. See supra text accompanying note 212 (noting that Congress hardly explored
availability of state remedies).
425. See Fla. Prepaid Post Secondary Educ. Expenses Bd. v. Coli. Sav. Bank. 527 U.S.
627,643 (1999) (criticizing Congress's failure to focus on intentional patent infringement).
426. See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 334 (1986) (finding that negligent conduct
does not violate due process).
427. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (1994) (defining patent infringement very broadly).
428. Fla. Prepaid, 521 U.S. at 647.
429. /d. at629.
430. /d. at 646.
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the Court's own interpretation that the Constitution condemned only intentional violations with wholly inadequate remedies. The information upon
which Congress based its interpretation was relevant, however, to the thoroughness with which Congress had considered the matter and to the logic of
the proposed remedy. As the Court has repeatedly emphasized, under Section
5, "[s]trong measures appropriate to address one harm may be an unwarranted
response to another, lesser one." 431 If the Court is to be taken at its word,
Congress might have persuaded the Court to expand constitutional protection
if the problem of state patent infringement appeared to be severe.
There is nothing inherently wrong with examining the legislative record
as part of a larger examination ofthe totality of the circumstances surrounding
Congress's interpretation of the Constitution. How else is Congress to persuade the Court to follow its interpretation of constitutional rights? Like an
agency hoping for respect for an informal interpretation, Congress and its
advocates must gather and present a basis - including an empirical basis - for
persuasive power. From the beginning, the Court has reviewed each of Con. gress' s enforcement enactments "with reference to the historical experience
which it reflects." 432
In cases like Morrison and Garrett, however, it seems clear that the Court
flatly refused to be persuaded, despite voluminous evidence that discrimination of grave concern to Congress, and presumably the nation, had occurred
and continued to occur. The VAWA and the ADA fell not from a.quantitative, but from a qualitative, record deficiency. The Court locked Congress
into an interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause at Step One, then chastised it at Step Two for failing to compile a record to support the Court's own
view of the scope of the equality guarantee. Or, more accurately perhaps, the
Court collapsed Step One and Step Two, thereby depriving Congress of its
chance to persuade the Court.
The Court's approach surely must leave Congress scratching its head. For
all the Court's criticism in Garrett of the congruence and proportionality ofthe
ADA, the Court never explained why Congress's construction of the Equal
Protection Clause was not persuasive. Congress was thorough in its work,
finding widespread discrimination against the disabled across the nation, and
specifically by the states. The logic of its position that negative stereotypes,
fear, and prejudice were irrational bases upon which to make employment
decisions was arguably supported by the Court's own precedent in Cleburne.
Only a disingenuous reading of Cleburne, and a narrow view as to what evidence "counts" under the congruence and proportionality standard, could lead
431.
432.

City ofBoerne v. Flores, 527 U.S. 507, 530 (1997).
South Carolina v. Ka1zenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 308 (1966).

914

59 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 839 (2002)

the Court to withhold all deference. The Court should at the very least explain
its position that the only interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause that has
merit is one that narrowly condemns only the most irrational discrimination by
state officials. It surely must explain why only instances of discrimination that
have been found, or likely would be found, to violate judicial notions of
constitutional mandates can be condemned under the Equal Protection Clause.
The Court had no good answer in Garrett to why a prophylactic measure
aimed at negative stereotypes and the like was due no judicial respect whatsoever. The most that can be said is that the Court simply would have decided the
matter differently ifthe case had come before it. That is not a sufficient reason
for withholding deference from an interpretation, even under the less deferential Skidmore standard. The same criticism applies to the Court's decision in
Morrison, in which the Court, faced with a massive legislative record, went out
of its way to narrow the contours of Congress's authority under Section 5 to
remedying or preventing only the most obvious and judicially sanctionable
state action. Both the VAWA and the ADA were thoroughly considered
enactments with logically sound premises.
Returning to the agency analogy, it is hard to imagine that a court would
invalidate something similar to either the ADA or the VAWA if an agency
announced them as policy, even in an infonnal proceeding, and presented a
comparable record. The thoroughness and care with which Congress attacked
the problems of disability and gender bias are beyond dispute. Their logic, in
addition, appears just as strong as that offered in support of the Voting Rights
Act. In upholding the Voting Rights Act, the Court recognized that discrimination does not always take the most obvious forms and that Congress sometimes
has to expand the net to capture the more subtle forms of bias.433 Congress
reasoned in the ADA and the VAWA that discrimination often takes the form
of systemic disparate impact resulting from negative attitudes and stereotypes.
Although it is difficult to imagine ever duplicating the historical experience by
which the Voting Rights Act was measured, the ADA and the VAWA came
very close and are consistent with Congress's prior uses of the constitutional
enforcement power. These were prophylactic measures intended to avoid the
very history that necessitated the Voting Rights Act.
One might argue that agency construction and congressional construction
are fundamentally different, that Marbury more closely guards the Court's
power to construe the Constitution than other forms of governing law. Agency
constructions are always subject to legislative supremacy, while Congress's
constructions must be subject to something else. The "something else" does
not have to be judicial supremacy, however. The Skidmore approach leaves
433. See id. at 355 (Black. J., concurring and dissenting) (noting Congress's power to
protect right to vote against subtle discrimination).
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Marbury intact, and the ultimate determination ofthe law's substance lies with
the courts. The four members ofthe Court who were persuaded by Congress's
interpretation of equality in the ADA, ADEA, and VAWA understand this.
The five in the majority who consistently invalidate Section 5 enactments
cannot be persuaded to share constructive power regardless of Congress's
thoroughness, consistency, and logic.
Unfortunately, that means that Congress and the Court cannot be 11partners11 in the enforcement of the Equal Protection Clause, the Due Process
Clause, or any other constitutional guarantees administered under the enforcement provisions. 434 It means, in effect, that there can be no dialogue between
the judicial and legislative branches concerning how to define the substance of
constitutional rights. No matter how hard Congress works to document and
explain more subtle forms of discrimination, a majority ofthe Court will refuse
to be informed, freezing the meaning of the Constitution where it now stands.
No matter how ingrained gender bias becomes in the. state criminal justice
system, the Court will cling to its outdated precedents limiting remedial
measures to the conduct of state actors. 11 1nventive11 enactments like the Voting
Rights Act of 1965 can have no modem counterparts because, under current
Section 5 precedents, stare decisis forbids Congress from all expansion and
experimentation. 435
This Article does not suggest that the Court simply return to an interpretation of Congress's Section 5 power that is coextensive with the Necessary and
Proper Clause. If Section 5 is to be used to protect patent rights and the like,
perhaps a heightened judicial review is in order to check the growth of the
power. A reversion to Katzenbach v. Morgan is unlikely to occur in any event,
at least not without some significant additional doctrinal changes. In a sense,
the scaling back of Section 5 is the inevitable result of the Court's corralling
of Congress, first by eliminating its power to waive state sovereign immunity
under Article I, then diminishing - or at least hinting at diminution of- the
commerce power. Congress could react by more judiciously exercising the
commerce power. Insofar as Congress chooses instead to rely on Section 5, it
can expect a vigilant Court.
The administrative analogy proposed in this Article is simply that - an
analogous model suggested for use in reviewing Congress's enforcement
power under Section 5 and the other Civil War Amendments. As an analogy,
it is obviously imperfect. It does not, for example, fully solve the dilemma of
the Court's heightened legislative record requirement. If Congress is institu434. See Post & Siegel, supra note 158, at 510-22 (discussing lack of partnership between
Congress and Court following Congress's entry into forum of enforcing equality values).
435. See supra Part V.B (discussing Court's reliance on stare decisis in rejecting empirical
record of Section 5 legislation).
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tionally incapable of compiling sufficient records, either through lack of
resources or lack of will, the Court's "congruence and proportionality" standard is an empty promise. There is every reason to believe that Congress is
capable ofcompiling persuasive records, as the VAWA and ADA enactments
demonstrate. 436 Whether it has the will to continue to do so is another matter.
Part of the appeal of using the Skidmore model under Section 5 is that it
does not require a complete retreat from the Court's current practice. A limited
deference principle permits the Court to continue to examine any record
materials Congress or its advocates may submit and encourages the Court to do
so without limiting the scope of its inquiry so as to preclude the possibility of
deference to legislative constructions. Paying attention to Skidmore and Mead
at least points out the inconsistent state ofthe deference principle as applied by
the Relmquist Court. As things now stand, agencies, which do not interpret
under any express constitutional grant, are always afforded the opportunity to
persuade a court of the validity of their constructions, while Congress, which
legislates under Section 5's grant of power, is denied any similar opportunity
across the board.

VII. Conclusion

In the name ofMarbury, the Rehnquist Court has reclaimed the power to
"say what the law is." As executive agencies have seen their broad authority
to render interpretations of federal statutes retracted in Chevron's shrinking
domain, Congress's enforcement powers under Section 5 have been drastically
limited in a recent series of cases. The judicial supremacy model has taken
firm hold under Section 5, as the Court has emphatically asserted that the
power to "say what the law is" belongs exclusively to the judicial branch.
However, whereas agencies are always granted the opportunity to persuade the
courts of the merit of their interpretations, the Court is not currently open to
persuasion by Congress.
This Article analogizes Congress's power to enforce the Constitution
under Section 5 to agency enforcement of federal statutes. Unlike most commentary, this Article approaches the current Section 5 dilemma not as an
empirical quagmire, but as a recurring difficulty in which courts share the interpretive function with other departments of government. The approach this
Article has taken attempts to meet the Rehnquist Court on its own terms. The
Court has been applying a two-step inquiry under Section 5 that roughly
resembles the Chevron two-step inquiry applied to agency interpretations of
federal statutes. The fundamental difference has·been the Rehnquist Court's
436. See text accompanying supra notes 236 and 258 (noting vast legislative records backing these statutes).
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unwillingness to be persuaded under a Skidmore-type analysis that Congress's
construction of the Constitution is entitled to respect and some measure of
deference. Eight justices are willing to listen to agency explanations, while
five members of the Court selfishly refuse to share interpretive power under
Section 5 on the ground that Congress is bound by a broad notion of stare
decisis to follow the Court's precedents under the Equal Protection Clause. By
refusing to be persuaded, the Court cuts off any dialogue with Congress
concerning widespread societal problems like gender and disability discrimination. The judicial-legislative partnership under Section 5 has served the nation
well. It is difficult to imagine where we would be today if the Rehnquist
Court's philosophy had driven prior Courts or prior Congresses. The Section
5 partnership is in imminent danger ofbeing extinguished inMarbury's name.
This Article contends that there is room under the Constitution for both judicial
supremacy and shared interpretive power. The Court need look no further than
Chevron's path to verify that this is so.

